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The Taxation of Emissions Permits
Distributed for Free As Part of a
Carbon Cap-and-Trade Program
Gary M. Lucas, Jr.*
Introduction
Climate change legislation is one of the Obama administra-
tion's top priorities.1 The administration has proposed regu-
lating carbon emissions using a cap-and-trade program .2
If adopted, the program will place a cap on the aggregate
carbon emissions of certain firms. Under the program, the
government will create emissions permits in an amount cor-
responding to the cap and will require certain firms to sur-
render a permit for each ton of carbon emitted. After the
government initially distributes permits, firms will be able to
buy and sell them on a secondary market.
Both the administration' and many economists prefer
that the government initially distribute permits by auction.'
Auctioning permits would raise billions of dollars in revenue
and force firms to pay for their emissions .5 Nevertheless,
Congress seems unlikely to adopt legislation that auctions
all permits. 6 In prior cap-and-trade programs, including the
acid rain program, the government gave away permits to the
firms required to surrender them .7 Similarly, the Waxman-
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1. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, ExEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, A NEW
ERA~ OF RESPONSIBILITY: RENEWING AMERICAS PROMISE 100- 01 (2009) [here-
inafter 0MB BUDGET OVERVIEW]; John M. Broder, Setting 'Green' GoalsN.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 27, 2009, at Al16; John M. Broder, Obamas Greenhouse Gas Gam-
ble, N.Y TIMES, Feb. 28, 2009, at Al 5.
2. 0MB BUDGET OVERVIEW, supra note 1, at 100-01.
3. See id.; John M. Broder, Adding Something for Everyone, House Leaders Gained
a Climate Bill, N.Y TIMES, July 1, 2009, at A20.
4. See, e.g., Alan D. Viard, Don't Give Away the Cap-and- Trade Permits!, 123 TAX
NOTES 613, 616-17 (2009).
5. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, COST ESTIMATE: H.R. 2454 AMERICAN CLEAN
ENERGY AND SECURITY ACT OF 2009, at 10-12 (2009) [hereinafter COST ESTI-
MATE]; OMB BUDGET OVERVIEW, supra note 1, at 100.
6. David Wessel, Pollution Politics and the Climate-Bill Giveaway, WALL ST. J.,
May 23, 2009, at A2 (noting that giving away permits "may be the only politi-
cally possible way to get any cap on carbon emissions through Congress").
7. Terry M. Dinan & Diane Lim Rogers, Distri butional Effects of Carbon Allow-
ance Trading:- How Government Decisions Determine Winners and Losers, 55
NAT'L TAx J. 199, 201 (2002). Note, however, that the government is not lim-
Markey cap-and-trade bill passed by the House of Represen-
tatives in June of 2009 gives away a large portion of permits.'
Assuming that the government gives away emissions per-
mits, an important unresolved issue is whether recipient
firms should pay federal income tax on any permits that they
receive. This Article addresses that question.9
After adoption of the acid rain cap-and-trade program,
which regulates sulfur dioxide emissions, the Internal Rev-
enue Service ("IRS") issued administrative guidance that
allows firms receiving sulfur dioxide permits to exclude the
permits from income. 0 This means that the permits are not
taxed when received. Instead, excluded permits have a tax cost
basis 1 of zero' 12 so a firm that sells permits that it received for
free will be taxed on the full amount of the sales proceeds."
The result is that free permits are not permanently exempt
from tax, but instead the tax is deferred. Tax deferral pro-
vides firms with a benefit similar to receiving an interest-free
loan from the government. 1 4 So deferral is valuable to firms
and costly to the government.
This Article argues that the government should not extend
the tax exclusion that currently applies to free sulfur dioxide
permits to free carbon permits."5 Instead, free carbon permits
should be taxed when received, which would eliminate costly
tax deferral. 1 6
ited to giving permits to the firms required to surrender them. Because they
can be sold, permits are valuable even to firms not covered by cap-and-trade.
8. American Clean Energy and SecurityAct of 2009, H.R. 2454, 11 1th Cong.§
782 (2009).
9. The Waxman-Markey bill does not address the taxation of free permits.
10. Rev. Rul. 92-16, 1992-1 C.B. 15.
11. For an explanation of tax cost basis, see infra note 107.
12. See Rev. Rul. 92-16, 1992-1 C.B. 15. A firm receiving free permits might have
to capitalize transaction costs, e.g., legal fees, incurred in obtaining those per-
mits, in which case the permits' tax basis would include the transaction costs.
See Rev. Proc. 92-9 1, 1992-2 C.B. 503. For simplicity, the Article will ignore
this possibility and assume that the tax basis of free permits is zero.
13. See I.R.C. § 100 1 (2006).
14. See MICHAEL J. GRAETz & DEBORAH H. SCHENCK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXA-
TION: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 297 (6th ed. 2009) (discussing the benefits of
tax deferral).
15. Given that carbon permits will have significant value, eliminating deferral
could produce substantial revenue. See infra notes 100 and 110.
16. If permits were taxed upon receipt, they would have a tax basis equal to their
initial value and this basis would reduce the taxable gain upon any subsequent
sale. See infra note 107.
16 ~JOURNAL OF ENERGY & ENVIRONMENTAL LAW520I16 5-2010
Part I discusses the general features and likely distribu-
tive effects of a carbon cap-and-trade program. In the long
rull, consumers will bear most of the program's Lusts as the
prices of carbon-intensive goods and services increase. 17 Nev-
ertheless, after the program is adopted, some firms may suf-
fer transition losses as increased costs reduce their profits.18
Additionally, the government can alter the program's distrib-
utive effects through its control over permits. 9 For example,
the government could give permits to firms to avoid price
increases or to compensate firms for transition losses. If, as
seems likely, the government gives permits away, the result-
ing distributive effects will depend largely on whether the
recipient firms are subject to rate regulation. State regulators
will likely require that rate-regulated firms use any permits
that that they receive to benefit their customers, e.g., by keep-
ing prices low. 20 Permits allocated to unregulated firms, how-
ever, generally will benefit those firms' shareholders, not their
customers and not consumers . 2 1 Unregulated firms that are
required to surrender permits will increase prices to reflect the
opportunity cost of using permits in the production process.
This means that unregulated firms will increase prices even
if they receive permits for free because surrendering permits
entails giving up the potential revenue that could be earned
from selling them .2 2 In short, giving permits to unregulated
firms generally will not protect consumers .23
Parts II and III consider the appropriate tax treatment
of permits given to unregulated firms .2 4 Part 11 argues that
because the permits will be valuable and easy to sell and
will generally benefit shareholders, unregulated firms that
receive permits for free have economic income that should be
taxed .25 Part II also addresses and rejects the argument that
free permits should not be taxed because they will merely
compensate firms for transition losses .2 6 Although cap-and-
trade may cause transition losses, free allocation of permits
may overcompensate at least some firms, causing them to
be better off than if cap-and-trade were not adopted . 2 7 As
17. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, SHIFTING THE COST BURDEN OF A CARBON CAP-AND-
TRtADE PROGRAM 10 (2003) [hereinafter SHIFTING THE COST BURDEN].
18. Id.
19. Id. at 3-4.
20. See infra note 190 and Part IV.
21 . By "unregulated," I mean that that the firms are not subject to rate regulation.
22. See, e.g., CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, TRADE-OFFS IN ALLOCATING ALLOWANCES
FOR C02 EMISSIONS 5 (2007) [hereinafter TRA4DE-OFFS]; Viard, supra note 4,
at 616-17.
23. For a caveat to this analysis, see infra note 180.
24. 'These would include, e.g., the permits that the Waxman-Markey bill gives to
merchant coal generators (i.e., unregulated coal-fired power plants) and to
oil refineries. American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454,
111 th Cong. §§ 783(c), 787 (2009).
25. For a definition of economic income, see infra note 114.
26. For a discussion of this argument, see JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, CLIMATE
CHANGE LEGISLATION: TAx CONSIDERATIONS 9-10 (2009) [hereinafter JOINT
COMM. ON TAxATION]. The Joint Committee's report notes that the IRS may
have created a tax exclusion for free sulfur dioxide permits because it did not
believe that cap-and-trade produced a net accession to wealth.
27. Eg., Dallas Burtraw & Karen Palmer, Compensation Rules for Climate Policy in
the Electricity Sector, 27 J. POi'y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 819 (2008) (noting that
a result, the case for a tax exclusion for free permits is not
especially strong. Moreover, because a tax exclusion entails
a tax basis of zero, it miay produce a significant lock-in effect
that causes firms to refuse to sell their permits in order to
avoid paying tax on the resulting gain .28 This lock-in effect
may increase the overall cost of the cap-and-trade program .29
Additionally, Part III argues that firms should be taxed
even if it turns out that the permits that they receive serve
only to compensate them for transition losses. Ideally, the
government would not use free permits to compensate firms
because doing so will invite wasteful lobbying and may result
in overcompensation.3 0 Compensating transition losses also
effectively rewards firms that have failed to anticipate climate
change legislation and to take steps to reduce their carbon
emissions. 1 This may discourage firms from anticipating
future changes in the law, particularly new environmental
regulations, which might result in excessive investment in
technologies that are harmful to the environment.12 In short,
compensating firms is a bad idea in principle and should be
avoided. But if the government chooses to give permits away,
then taxing the permits when received will at least reduce the
net amount of any compensation. This is desirable because it
moves us toward the optimal amount of compensation, i.e.,
zero.
Part IV examines the appropriate tax treatment of per-
mits given to local distribution companies ("LDCs"), which
are rate-regulated firms that distribute electricity and natu-
ral gas to residential, commercial, and industrial users.3 3 The
Waxman-Markey bill allocates a substantial share of permits
to LDCs ostensibly for the benefit of consumers.3 Because
LDCs are rate-regulated firms, state regulators will require
that they use any permits that they receive to benefit their
customers, e.g., by selling the permits to finance rebates. As a
result, LDCs arguably will not have economic income from
receiving permits. 35
Nevertheless, Part IV argues that LDCs should be taxed
on any permits that they receive. TIhe rationale is as follows.
"free allocation of allowances ... may overcompensate producers for their loss
in value"); TRADE-OFFS, supra note 22, at 5; Viard, supra note 4, at 616-17.
28. See Ethan Yale, Taxing Cap-and- Trade Environmental Regulation, 371J. LEGAL
STUD. 535, 541 (2008) [hereinafter Yale 1].
29. Id. at 543.
30. See Burtraw & Palmer, supra note 27, at 836-43 (explaining that allocating
permits to compensate electricity generators could lead to overcompensation
of many firms).
31. Cf Louis Kaplow, Transition Policy: A Conceptual Framework, 131J. Contemp.
Legal Issues 161, 181 (2003) [hereinafter Kaplow 1] (noting that when the
government bans a product without compensating transition losses "the an-
ticipation of transition losses ... will efficiently discourage ... investment ex
ante").
32. See DANIEL SHAIWRO, WHEN RULES CHANGE 84-85 (2000) [hereinafter WHEN
RULES CHANGE].
33. See American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111Ith
Cong. §§ 783(b), 784 (2009).
34. See id.
35. See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 26, at 9. The view that LDCs will
not have economic income is debatable. For further discussion of this point,
see infra note 333.
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Giving permits to LDCs is bad policy.3 6 If LDCs use their
permits to provide rebates, the rebates may reduce the incen-
tive to conserve electricity and natural gas and may produce
windfalls for the shareholders of the LDCs' commercial and
industrial customers.317 There are more efficient and effective
ways for the government to relieve the burden that cap-and-
trade imposes on consumers. For example, the government
could simply auction permits and send rebates directly to
consumers.3 8 As a consequence, it would be better if LDCs
received no permits. But if they do receive permits, then tax-
ing the permits will reduce their net cost to the government
and their net value to LDCs. This may be beneficial because
it will reduce the amount of any rebates, thereby increasing
the incentive to conserve and limiting windfalls to sharehold-
ers. It will also increase the amount of revenue available to
the government for use in reducing the deficit, cutting taxes,
or increasing spending on other programs.3 9
1. The General Features and Distributive
Effects of a Carbon Cap-and-Trade
Program
This Part explains how a carbon cap-and-trade program will
likely work and its distributive effects. Section A contains
an overview of the program's general features. Section B
describes how the costs that firms incur will be distributed
among shareholders, workers, and consumers. Section C dis-
cusses how the government can use its control over permits
to alter the program's distributive effects. Section -D briefly
explains how free permits will affect the value of firms that
receive them.
A. General Features
A carbon cap-and-trade program4 willhv w rmr
features-the emissions cap and emissions permits .4 ' T he
emissions cap limits the annual aggregate carbon emissions
36. Eg, CHAD STONE & HANNAH SHAW, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORI-
TIES, SENATE CAN STRENGTHEN CLIMATE LEGISLATION BY REDUCING CORPO-
RATE WELFARE AND BOOSnING TRUE CONSUMER RELIEF 1-2 (2009); CHAD
STONE, CTn. ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, HOLDING DowN INCREASES
IN UTILITY BILLS IS A FLAWED WAY To PROTECT CONSUMERS WHILE FIGHTING
GLOBAL WARMING 1 (2009) [hereinafter STONE, HOLDING DOWN INCREASES];
Hearing Before the Sen. Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources on the Costs and
Benefits for Energy Consumers and Energy Prices Associated with the Allocation of
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Allowances, 111lth Cong. (2009) (statement of Chad
Stone); see also Hearing Before the Sen. Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources
on the Costs and Benefits for Energy Consumers and Energy Prices Associated with
the Allocation of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Allowances, I111th Cong. (2009)
(statement of Gilbert Metcalf) [hereinafter Statement of Gilbert Metcalf]; Vi-
ard, supra note 4, at 619-20.
37. Eg, STONE, HOLDING DowN INCREASES, sup/ra note 36, at 4-5; Viard, supra
note 4, at 619.
38. STONE, HOLDING DowtN INCREASES, supra note 36, at 1, 7.
39. Whether this outcome is beneficial depends on whether the government would
use the additional revenue in a way that is preferable to giving it to LDCs.
40. The cap-and-trade program created by the Waxman-Markey bill incorporates
many of the features described in this Section.
41. Emissions permits are Sometimes referred to as "allowances," but this Article
uses the shorter term "permits" instead.
of covered firms4 2 to a specified amount usually expressed in
tons of emissions .43 The program will likely be phased in so
that the cap decreases over time .4 4 The government will dis-
tribute a quantity of permits corresponding to the cap. 45 One
permit confers the right to emit one ton of carbon .4 6 In other
words, a covered firm must surrender a permit for each ton of
carbon that it emits during the year.47 Following the initial
distribution of permits, firms (and others who wish to do so)
can buy and sell permits on the secondary market.48
Firms that own more permits than they are required to
surrender can save the excess permits for use in a future
year, a feature known as "banking."49 Analysts anticipate
that firms will reduce emissions by more than necessary in
the early years of the program so that they can bank per-
mits for use in future years, when the permits will become
more expensive as the result of a more stringent cap.50 So in
the program's early years, banking will increase the demand
for permits, thereby increasing their price. 1 It will have the
opposite effect in later years, i.e., it will increase permit sup-
ply and decrease permit price .5 2 Analysts anticipate that firms
will bank permits until the expected annual appreciation in
permit price provides the firms with a return on banked per-
mits equal to the return on comparable investments. 3
The purpose of cap-and-trade is to reduce carbon emis-
sions to the capped level at the lowest possible social cost.5 4
The program creates flexibility in reducing emissions by
allowing firms to take advantage of the fact that the cost of
emissions abatement varies across firms and across time. 5 For
example, if Firm A can reduce emissions at a lower cost than
Firm B, instead of requiring that both firms reduce emis-
sions, the program allows A to reduce its emissions and to
sell its excess permits to B. This lowers the overall cost of
reducing emissions.
In theory, cap-and-trade will allocate emissions abatement
to the cheapest sources first.5 6 Firms that find it cheaper to
42. Where it might otherwise be unclear I use the term "covered firms" to refer to
firms that the program requires to surrender permits.
43. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, AN EVALUATION OF CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAMS FOR
REDUCING U.S. CARBON EMISSIONS 5 (2001) [hereinafter EVALUATION OF
CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAMS]; Robert N. Stavins, A Meaningful U.S. Cap-and-
Trade System to Address Climate Change, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. R~v. 293, 298
(2008) [hereinafter Stavins I].
44. The cap-and-trade program created by the Waxmnan-Markey bill is phased in
gradually. See American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454,
111 th Cong. § 721 (e) (2009).
45. See Stavins I, supra note 43, at 298.









The Waxman-Markey bill permits banking. H.R. 2454 § 725 (a).




54. See Stavins 1, supra note 43, at 298; HARVEY S. ROSEN & TED GAmER, PUBLIC
FINANCE 86-94 (8th ed. 2008).
55. See Stavins 1, supra note 43, at 329-330; ROSEN & GAER, supra note 54, at 94;
N. GREGORY MANnIW, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS 216 (4th ed. 2007).
The flexibility that a cap-and-trade program allows in reducing emissions is the
program's chief advantage over traditional command-and-cnntrol environmen-
tal regulation. See ROSEN & GAYER, supra note 54, at 94-95.
56. See Stavins I, supra note 43, at 298; M.ANnw, supra note 55, at 216.
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reduce emissions than to purchase permits will abate .5 7 Con-
versely, firms that find it cheaper to purchase permits than to
reduce emissions will purchase permits. 8
If the market for permits is efficient, the cost of a per-
mit should equal the marginal cost of reducing emissions by
one ton.5 9 The reason is that each firm that has a marginal
abatement cost that is lower than the permit price will abate
(selling any excess permits that it holds) until its marginal
abatement cost increases to equal the price of a permit.60
Conversely, each firm that has a marginal abatement cost
that is higher than the permit price will buy permits until
its marginal abatement cost decreases to equal the price of
a permit .61 As a result of this process, the permit price will
equal the marginal cost of abatement .6 2
B. Distribution of the Burden of Costs Imposed on
Firms
A cap-and-trade program will impose substantial costs on
firms, e.g., permit costs and abatement costs.63 Ultimately,
the extent to which these costs reduce profits will depend
on whether firms can shift them to employees (by reducing
wages) and to consumers (by raising prices) .64
To understand why, consider a program that requires
fossil-fuel suppliers to surrender permits to cover the poten-
tial carbon emissions in the fuels that they sell .6 To preserve
profits, the suppliers will attempt to shift their permit costs
to employees (by reducing wages) and customers (by rais-
ing fuel prices) .6 6 As a result, firms that use fossil fuels, e.g.,
electricity companies, will pay higher fuel prices. These firms
will also incur abatement costs, e.g., the additional costs of
generating electricity using alternatives to fossil fuels. Fos-
sil-fuel users will attempt to shift these additional costs to
their employees and customers. Ultimately, market interac-
tions will determine how prices (including wages) adjust in
response to cap-and-trade, which in turn will determine how
shareholders, workers, and consumers share the burden of
cap-and-trade's costs.6 7
57. See Stavins 1, supra note 43, at 298.
58. Id
59. See Yale 1, supra note 28, at 536-37; ROSEN & GAYER, supra note 54, at 86-90.
60. See ROSEN & GAmER, supra note 54, at 89-90.
61. Seekid
62. See i.
63. Abatement costs include any cost that firms incur to reduce emissions. An
example would include the increased cost of producing electricity using renew-
able energy sources instead of using cheaper fossil fuels.
64. See, e.g., Stavins I, supra note 43, at 304-05; SHIFTING THE COST BURDEN,
supra note 11, at 2-3.
65. The point of regulation in a cap-and-trade program can be upstream or down-
stream. Stavins 1, supra note 43, at 309. An upstream program requires fossil-
fuel suppliers to surrender permits to cover potential emissions from burning
fossil fuels. Id A downstream program, on the other hand, requires fossil-fuel
users to surrender permits. Id. at 309 n.73. In general, the distributive effects of
a cap-and-trade program do not depend on the point of regulation. Id at 310.
In an upstream program, suppliers will raise the price of fossil fuels to reflect
permit costs. Id. In a downstream program, fossil fuel users will have to pay
permit costs directly. Id. Either way, the program makes using fossil fuels more
expensive, which will affect both suppliers and users. Id.
66. See Stavins I, supra note 43, at 3fl4fl5; SHIFTING THE COSr B'URDEN, supra
note 17, at 2-3.
67. See Stavins I, supra note 43, at 304-05.
Economists expect that in the long run, consumers will
absorb most of cap-and-trade's costs in the form of higher
prices. 68  Over time, firms that experience reduced returns
on their investments in carbon-intensive assets will redirect
capital toward more lucrative projects, e.g., renewable ener-
gy. 69 During the transition to a cap-and-trade program, how-
ever, firms, and by extension their shareholders, in industries
dependent on fossil fuels, particularly coal, may see their
investments decline in value.70
The costs of cap-and-trade may impose transition losses
on firms in two ways .71 First, to the extent that a firm cannot
shift its additional costs to others, it will lose profit on the
goods that it sells .7 2 Second, if a firm shifts costs to custom-
ers, the resulting price increase may reduce sales and elimi-
nate profits from those sales .73
C. Distributive Effects of Permit Allocation
We have seen that price changes will determine how the costs
that cap-and-trade imposes on firms are distributed among
shareholders, workers, and consumers. The government can,
however, dramatically alter these distributive effects through
its control over permits.74
Because the government will create fewer permits than
covered firms wish to surrender, permits will acquire a scar-
city value .'5 The government can capture this value by auc-
tioning permits, in which case its use of auction revenue will
substantially determine the program's overall distributive
effects.76 For example, Congress can use auction revenue to
68. See SHIFTING THE COST BURDEN, supra note 17, at 10.
69. See id.
70. Id. Similarly, workers in affected industries may lose their jobs or experience
wage cuts. See idi. at 3, 14.
71. Idat 3.
72. Id.
73. Id. Economists expect that the industries most likely to experience transition
losses are fossil-fuel suppliers, particularly coal companies, electricity genera-
tors, oil refineries, and certain energy-intensive industries. See, e.g., A. Lans
Bovenberg & Lawrence H. Goulder, Neutralizing the Adverse Industry Impacts
of C02 Abatement Policies: What Does It Cost?, in BEHAVIORAL AND DISTRI-
BUTIONAL EFFECTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 45, 66-67 (Carlo Carraro &
Gilbert E. Metcalf eds., 2001).
74. See SHIFTING THE COST BURDEN, supra note 11, at 3-4. Although the gov-
ernment can use auction revenue or free permits to compensate shareholders,
workers, and consumers, it cannot fully compensate everyone. See id. at 4. The
reason is that the program's gross costs (i.e., its costs ignoring any environmen-
tal benefits) will exceed the value of the permits. Id. It may seem that cap-and-
trade's most significant cost will be the cost of permits. But in reality, permit
costs are not real social costs. See Robert N. Stavins, A U.S. Cap-and-Trade
System to Address Global Climate Change 12 (BROOKINGS INST., Discussion Pa-
per No. 2001 13, 2001). When a firm purchases a permit, it merely transfers
income to the seller (e.g., the government or another firm). See id. The loss to
the buyer is exactly offset by revenue to the seller. Some of the program's costs,
however, will not involve income transfers. See SHIFTING THE COST BURDEN,
supra note 17, at 2-4. The program will impose real social costs. Id. It will
divert resources to produce goods in a way that reduces carbon emissions and
avoids cheap fossil fuels. Id. It will also require consumers to reduce consump-
tion of carbon-intensive goods (e.g., driving). See id. Unlike permit costs, these
costs represent real resource costs and welfare losses that will not be recovered
elsewhere in the economy. Id at 3. As a result, when these costs are added to
permit costs, the aggregate costs of the program will exceed permit value, mak-
ing full compensation impossible. Id. at 4.
75. See SHIFING THE COST BURDEN, supra note 17, at 3.
76. Idat 3-4.
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compensate consumers for price increases or to cut income
and payroll taxes.77
Alternatively, the government can give permits away for
free. In prior cap-and-trade programs, including the acid
rain program, the government gave away permits to covered
firms to relieve the regulatory burden imposed upon them .78
Moreover, it seems likely that the government will give away
at least some permits if it adopts a carbon cap-and-trade
program. 79
It may seem that free permits will benefit consumers
because firms that receive them will not be forced to increase
prices to cover permit costs. Nevertheless, this intuition
is incorrect.8 0 The reason is that covered firms will likely
increase prices to reflect the opportunity cost of using free
permits in the production process (i.e., the forgone opportu-
nity to sell any permits that are surrendered). 1 Paradoxically,
firms are likely to charge their customers for using permits
for which the firms themselves do not pay. Since firms will
not forgo price increases simply because they received their
permits for free, free permits generally will benefit the share-
holders of recipient firms, not consumers.
This analysis, however, does not apply to LDCs.812 State reg-
ulators will likely require LDCs to use any permits that they
receive to benefit their customers, not their shareholders.8 3
D. Free Permits and Firm Value
It may seem that cap-and-trade will necessarily decrease the
value of covered firms even if those firms receive free per-
mits.8 4 Nevertheless, as explained in detail in Part 11, free
permits may actually increase the value of a covered firm
relative to its value prior to adoption of the program. Briefly
stated, this can happen for two reasons.
First, some firms likely to be covered by the program own
low-carbon assets that will increase in value because cap-and-
trade will increase the price of the products those assets pro-
duce without a proportionate increase in costs.85I For example,
many electricity companies own nuclear and hydroelectric
facilities in addition to fossil-fuel fired power plants.816 The
nuclear and hydroelectric facilities will benefit from cap-and-
trade because the program will increase electricity prices, but
these facilities will not incur substantial costs.8 7
77. See id. at 4.
78. See Dinan & Rogers, supra note 7, at 20 1.
79. The Waxmnan-Markey bill gives away a large portion of permits to firms. See
American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 11 1th Cong.§
182 (2009).
80. E.g., TRL.DE-OFS, supra note 22, at 5; see also Viard, supra note 4, at 616-17.
81. Eg., TRADE-OFFS, supra note 22, at 5; see alsoViard, supra note 4, at 616-17.
For further discussion of this point, see infra Part JI.
82. For an additional exception, see infra note 180.
83. See infra Part IV.
84. This Section discusses cap-and-trade's effects on unregulated firms. State regu-
lators will likely adjust the prices of rate-regulated firms to ensure that cap-and-
trade has little if any effect on their value.
85. See Stavins I, supra note 43, at 305; Burtraw & Palmer, supra note 27, at 826-
27; Dallas Burtraw et al., The Effect on Asset Values of the Allocation of Carbon
Dioxide Emissions Allowances, ELECTRICITY J., June 20fl2, at 51, 56-57.
86. See Burtraw et al., supra note 85, at 56.
87. 1d. at 56-57.
Second, as already mentioned, covered firms will pass on
a substantial portion of their costs to customers by raising
prices88 and will even raise prices to reflect the opportunity
cost of using permits that they received for free. This may
cause some firms to end up in a better position with the cap-
and-trade program in place than without it.8"
1I. Permits Allocated to Unregulated Firms
This Part argues that the government should require unreg-
ulated firms receiving permits to include those permits in
income for tax purposes. Section A provides background
by describing the tax exclusion that currently applies to free
sulfur dioxide permits. Section B briefly discusses the tax
policy objective of capital income neutrality and how a tax
imposed on economic income furthers that objective. Sec-
tion C explains that a tax exclusion for free permits creates a
non-neutral tax preference that may be both inefficient and
unfair. Sections D and E address and reject the argument
that an exclusion for free permits is justifiable on the grounds
that free permits will simply compensate firms for transition
losses.
A. The Tax Exclusion for Free Sulfur Dioxide Permits
The IRS has issued administrative guidance addressing the
taxation of sulfur dioxide permits distributed for free as part
of the acid rain cap-and-trade program.90 Under Revenue
Ruling 92-16, firms are not taxed when they receive free sul-
fur dioxide permits, and as a result, the permits have a tax
cost basis of zero. 1 Under Revenue Procedure 92-91, a firm
that surrenders a permit for compliance purposes takes a tax
deduction equal to the firm's basis in the permit. 2 Because
free permits have no basis, their surrender generates no
deduction. Moreover, a firm that sells permits that it received
for free generally will have taxable gain equal to the sales
proceeds.9 3
Unfortunately, Revenue Ruling 92-16 does not provide
a rationale for the tax exclusion that it creates .9 4 One pos-
sibility is that the IRS concluded that free permits merely
compensate covered firms for transition losses so that on net,
cap-and-trade does not make those firms better off even if
they receive free permits.9 5 Sections D and E of this Part
address this argument.
A second possible explanation is that the IRS was con-
cerned that a secondary market for sulfur dioxide permits










Hg., SHInING THE COST BURDEN, supra note 17, at 10.
Eg., TRtADE-OFFs, supra note 22, at 5; Viard, supra note 4, at 616-17.
Rev. Rul. 92-16, 1992-1 C.B. 15; Rev. Proc. 92-91, 1992-2 C.B. 503.
See Rev. Rul. 92-16, 1992-1 C.B. 15-16.
See Rev. Proc. 92-91, 1992-2 C.B. 503-04. In certain circumstances, the sur-
render of a permit may be treated as a nondeductible capital expenditure, e.g.,
if surrender is treated as a production cost of inventory under J.R.C. § 263A.
See id.
Rev. Rul. 92-16, 1992-1 C.B. 15-16.
SeJOINT COMM. OlNTAxATIflN, sup ra note 26, at 9 (discussing possible reasons
for the IRS's decision to exclude permits from income).
See id
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the acid rain program was the government's first significant
experience with cap-and-trade, and the program applies to a
limited number of firms, mostly electricity companies that
own coal-fired power plants .9 7 Without an active secondary
market, sulfur dioxide permits would have been difficult to
value for tax purposes, and firms might have had trouble sell-
ing the permits to raise cash to pay the tax.98
These administrative concerns, however, should not pre-
clude taxing free carbon permits. A carbon cap-and-trade
program will likely cover numerous firms from a number of
industries.99 Additionally, the value of carbon permits will
far exceed the value of sulfur dioxide permits, 00 and analysts
expect that carbon permits will be traded on an active sec-
ondary market. 01 So taxing carbon permits should not create
insurmountable valuation and liquidity problems. 1 0 2
Although taxing free carbon permits will be feasible, it
would conflict with the IRS's apparent reluctance to tax gov-
ernment grants of licenses and similar rights. 03 Neverthe-
less, this reluctance is likely based in large part on the same
administrative concerns that may explain the tax exclusion
for free sulfur dioxide permits. 1 04 Most government grants
of noncash property would be difficult to tax, either because
the property is hard to value or cannot easily be sold to pay
the tax. As already discussed, these administrative concerns
should not arise with respect to carbon permits. 05
Before considering why the government should not extend
the tax exclusion for sulfur dioxide permits to carbon per-
mits, it is important to recognize what is at stake. If a firm
receives permits and surrenders those permits in the year of
receipt, it generally will not matter whether the permits are
included in or excluded from income for tax purposes. As
we have seen, excluded permits produce no income upon
receipt, which means they have no tax basis and produce no
tax deduction when surrendered. 10 6 In effect, the tax system
simply ignores the permits. On the other hand, if firms had
97. See id. at 9-10.
98. See id. at 10.
99. 'The Congressional Budget Office estimates that the Waxman-Markey bill
would cover 1,400 facilities in various economic sectors, including electricity
generators, refineries, natural gas distributors, and certain carbon-intensive in-
dustries. COST ESTIMATE, supra note 5, at 4- 5. This estimate includes facilities
covered by a separate, smaller cap-and-trade program regulating hydrofluoro-
carbons. Id. at 5-7.
100. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that if the Waxman-Markey bill
is enacted, the permits eligible to be traded on the secondary market in 2012
will exceed $60 billion in value. Id. at 11. Note that this estimate includes the
value of permits issued as part of the separate cap-and-trade program regulat-
ing hydrofluorocarbons. Id
101. Eg., id.
102. See id. ("Within such a large and liquid market, allowances could be easily and
immediately traded for cash.").
103. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 67-135, 1967-1 C.B. 20; I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,606
(Feb. 21, 1981). For example, Revenue Ruling 67-135 involved leases of oil
and gas rights on federal lands administered by the Bureau of Land Manage-
ment. Rev. Rul. 67-135, 1967-1 C.B. 20-21. The Bureau leased the lands
without competitive bidding. Id. The IRS held that a taxpayer who obtained a
lease did not have income even if the rent under the lease was below market (so
that the lease itself had value). Id.
104. See JOINT COMM. ON TAxATION, supra note 26, at 10.
105. According to the Congressional Budget Office, "the free distribution of allow-
ances by the federal government [under the cap-and-trade program created by
the Waxman-Markey bill] would be essentially equivalent to the distribution
of cash grants." COST ESTIMATE, supra note 5, at I I.
106. Rev. Rul. 92-16, 1992-1 C.B. 15; Rev. Proc. 92-91, 1992-2 C.B. 503.
to include the value of free permits in income, the permits
would have a tax cost basis equal to their value at the time
of receipt. 10 7 Additionally, surrendering the permits would
generate a tax deduction equal to their basis. 08 As a result,
if a firm were to surrender its permits in the year it received
them, surrender of the permits would result in a deduction
that fully offset any income from receiving the permits. 09
This would produce the same result as if the permits were
simply excluded from income.
If, however, a firm banks its permits," 110t matters a great
deal whether the permits are included in or excluded from
income. Excluding the permits defers tax, e.g., until the per-
mits are sold. 11 Including the permits would mean that the
firm must pay tax in the year of receipt. (Because the firm
would take a tax basis in the permits equal to the amount
included in income, the permits would not be taxed twice. 12 )
As a result, the benefit of the tax exclusion is deferral. Defer-
ring tax is similar to receiving an interest-free loan from the
government. 1 3 The firm gets to invest the deferred amount
until the tax is due.
107. 'When a taxpayer includes the receipt of noncash property in income, generally
the property has a tax basis equal to the amount included in income, i.e., its tax
cost basis. BORIS 1. BITTKER ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAxATION OF INDIVIDU-
AIS 29.02[5] (3d ed. 2002); BOIS I. BIrrKrR & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FED-
ERALTAxATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS 41.2.5 (3d ed. 1999); see also
J.R.C. § 302(d) (2006) (basis of property received as a result of a dividend);
Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(d)(2)(i) (as amended in 2003) (basis of property received
as compensation for services).
108. Rev. Proc. 92-91, 1992-2 C.B. 504. The analysis in the text assumes that, as is
the case for sulfur dioxide permits, the surrender of a carbon permit will result
in a deduction equal to the permit's basis. This seems likely. See JOINT COMM.
ON TAxATION, supra note 26, at 7, 12-14 (considering the possibilities for tax-
ing permits).
109. As discussed supra note 92, in certain circumstances, the surrender of a permit
may be treated as a nondeductible capital expenditure. In that case, surrender
of the permit would not immediately result in a deduction that fully offset the
income from receiving the permit. Similarly, if the cap-and-trade program al-
lows firms to surrender permits in a year following the year in which emissions
occur, it is possible that a firm using the accrual method would be entitled to
a deduction in the year the emissions occurred and not in the year the permits
are surrendered. See JOINT COMM. ON TAxATION, supra note 26, at 13 n. 30. If
this were the case and a firm received permits and surrendered those permits to
cover emissions in the prior year, the firm could have income from the permits
that would not be offset by a deduction (because the firm would have already
taken the deduction in the prior year when emissions occurred).
110. The Congressional Budget Office expects that firms would bank a significant
number of permits if Waxman-Markey were enacted. COST ESTIMATE, supra
note 5, at 16 ("CBO estimates that by 2019, covered entities would undertake
significantly more mitigation than necessary to meet their annual emission
caps, banking about 2 billion mtCO~e of allowances.").
I111. See Rev. Rul. 92-16, 1992-1 C.B. 15; Rev. Proc. 92-91, 1992-2 C.B. 503.
112. More specifically, a firm that includes permits in income will receive a subse-
quent tax benefit either in the form of a deduction (if it surrenders the permits)
or tax-free basis recovery (if it sells the permits). A firm that excludes its permits
will not receive this benefit. For the excluding firm, however, the trade-off is
worth it. As explained in the text, taxpayers generally prefer to defer tax. So a
firm would generally prefer to exclude free permits from income rather than
include the permits in income in exchange for a subsequent deduction or basis
recovery.
113. GRAETZ & SCHENCK, supra note 14, at 297.
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B. Capital Income Neutrality and a Tax on Economic
Income
This Part argues that free permits should be taxed if they
constitute economic income. 1 4 To that end, this Section
briefly explains that a tax on economic income is appealing
because it produces capital income neutrality. 1 5
Many tax scholars support the idea of capital income neu-
trality, which exists in a tax system that imposes the same tax
burden on all capital income. 16 A tax that is neutral in this
sense does not distort the choice among particular invest-
ments.117 For example, a tax that exempts income from cer-
tain investments but not others is not neutral because it may
alter investment decisions. Conversely, a tax on economic
income is neutral (assuming that it taxes all types of capital
income at the same rate) 18 because it extends to all capital
income and does not favor particular investments. 1 9 Thus,
if we are going to have an income tax, preserving neutrality
provides support for using economic income as the tax base
(at least when measuring and taxing economic income does
not raise significant administrative concerns). 20
Capital income neutrality is desirable because it is gener-
ally thought to produce an efficient allocation of capital. 12 1
114. Because many of the firms aiffected by cap-aind-trade will likely he corpora-
tions subject to the corporate income tax, economic income in this context
means corporate economic income, which has been defined as "the algebraic
sum of (1) distributions to investors, less advances from investors, and (2) the
change in value of [the corporation s1 net worth during the income period."
Leon Cabinet & Ronald J. Coffey, The Implications of the Economic Concept
of Income for Corporation-Shareholder Income Tax Systems, 27 CASE W RES. L.
REv. 895, 915 (1977); see also Ethan Yale, When Are Capitalization Exceptions
Justfed? 51 TAx L. REv. 549, 552-53 (2004) [hereinafter Yale 11]. Thbis defini-
tion of corporate income is based on the Haig-Simons definition of personal
income, according to which personal income is consumption plus changes in
net worth during the period. Gabinet & Coffey, supra, at 915. Commenta-
tors have adapted the Haig-Simons definition of income to fit corporations by
dropping the consumption component, retaining the accretion component,
and adjusting for distributions to and receipts from investors.
115. Capital income is the income from savings.
116. See, e.g., WHEN RULES CHANGE, supra note 32, at 93-94; Yale 11, supra note
114, at 5 51-52; David A. Weisbach, Measurement and Tax Depreciation Policy:
The Case of Short- Term Intangibles, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 199, 208-09 (2004);
JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES 131-34, 216-18 (4th ed.
2008).
117. Yale II, supra note 114, at 5 51- 52.
118. Note, however, that capital income neutrality does not require that capital
income and wages be taxed at the same rate. Yale II, supra note 114, at 5 57.
119. See, e.g., SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 116, at 31 ('A system that taxes some
forms of income and does not tax others creates incentives for taxpayers to alter
their actions so that they earn (or appear to earn) less of the kind of income
that gets counted and more of the kind that does not."). Even if an income tax
exhibits capital income neutrality, the tax will not be neutral with respect to all
decisions. By reducing the return to labor and saving, an income tax distorts
the decisions to work and save. See generally JONATHAN GRUBER, PUBLIC Fi-
NANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 611-60 (2d ed. 2007). As a result, some tax schol-
ars advocate replacing the income tax with a consumption tax, which would
be neutral with respect to the decision to save. See, e.g., SLEMROD & BAKIJA,
supra note 116, at 212-13 (reviewing the arguments in favor of a consumption
tax). Nonetheless, if we are going to have an income tax, even consumption tax
advocates might favor a broad-based tax that imposes a low rate on all capital
income to a tax that imposes a higher rate on income from some investments
while exempting income from others.
120. Taxing certain types of economic income, e.g., unrealized appreciation or
imputed income from owner-occupied housing, might create administrative
problems.
12 1. Eg., Yale 11, supra note 114, at 5 51; Calvin H. Johnson, Soft Money Investing
under the Income Tax, 1989 U. ILL. L. REv. 1019, 1038 (1989). In theory, in
Investors direct capital into investments that have the high-
est expected aftertax returns. So if the government imposes
different tax burdens on different types of investments,
e.g., by exempting income from certain investments while
taxing income from others, then capital may flow into the
investments that have the highest expected aftertax returns
even if those investments do not have the highest expected
pretax returns. 1 2 2 In other words, capital will not be put to
its most productive use. But if the government imposes the
same tax burden on all investments, investors will in effect
decide among investments based upon their expected pretax
returns, which should generally maximize social welfare. 1 23
In addition to being efficient, neutrality is also fair
because it avoids windfalls to investors who happen to invest
in tax-favored assets. 12 4 If Congress reduces the relative tax
burden imposed on a particular asset, e.g., by exempting
income from the asset from tax, then investors will begin
buying that asset. The increase in demand will increase the
asset's price, thereby reducing its expected rate of return. 1 25 If
capital markets were perfect and only top bracket taxpayers
purchased the tax-favored asset, its price would continue to
increase until its expected rate of return came in line with the
expected aftertax rate of return of top bracket taxpayers on
similar taxable investments. 1 2 6 Once this happened, investors
would no longer receive a tax advantage from investing in
the tax-exempt asset. 12 7 Instead, the tax preference would be
Capitalized 
into the asset's 
price. 
12  8
certain circumstances deviating from neutrality may enhance efficiency. E.g.,
SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 116, at 131-34. For example, tax preferences
may encourage activities that produce positive externalities. Id. at 132-33.
Nonetheless, properly identifying appropriate deviations from neutrality is dif-
ficult. Id. at 132; Weisbach, supra note 116, at 208-09 ("Optimal tax theories
may indicate that some deviation from neutrality is desirable, but the size of
the adjustments tends to be sufficiently small and of uncertain direction, and
the benefits sufficiently minimal, that most economists assume that neutrality
is best.",). Moreover, once we abandon the neutrality norm, Congress may find
it more difficult to resist the temptation to enact tax preferences that benefit
special interests, even if those tax preferences have no principled justification.
SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 116, at 218; WHEN RULES CHANGE, sutpra note
32, at 94-95. 'Thus, a strong argument exists for neutrality as a guiding prin-
ciple with the caveat that exceptions may be appropriate in some instances.
122. Eg., Johnson, supra note 12 1, at 103 8; BIrrKrR & LOKKEN, supra note 107,
3.3.3.
123. Eg., Johnson, supra note 121, at 1038. Because it distorts the decisions to work
and save, an income tax imposes an efficiency cost even if it does not distort the
choice among particular investments. Nevertheless, the idea is that (at least in
practice) other things equal, an income tax that imposes the same tax burden
on all investments is likely to have a lower efficiency cost than an income tax
that favors certain investments and penalizes others.
124. Eg., Johnson, supra note 121, at 1036-38; Yale II, supra note 114, at 552; see
also BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 107, 3.3.3 (discussing the circumstances
under which a tax preference leads to a windfall); MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN,
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 431- 32 (1 ith ed. 2009) (same).
125. Eg., BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 107, 3.3.3., 3.3.4; CHIRELSTEIN, supra
note 124, at 429- 31; Johnson, supra note 121, at 1036-38; Yale 11, supra note
114, atS55l 52.
126. Eg., BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 101, 3.3.3; CHiREISTEIN, supra note
124, at 429-31; Johnson, supra note 121, at 1036-38; Yale II, supra note 114,
at 551-52.
127. Eg., BIrrKER & LOKKEN, supra note 107, 3.3.3; CHIRnLsrnIN, supra note
124, at 4293 31.
128. See, e.g., BITTKER & LnKKEN, supra note 1fl7, 3.3.3; CHIRELSTEIN, supra note
124, at 4293 1i; Johnson, supra note 121, at 1037; Yale 11, supra note 114, at
551-52.
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In reality, however, tax preferences are not always fully
capitalized into the price of tax-favored assets . 12 1 Investors
often fail to reallocate funds until the aftertax rates of return
on similar investments equalize. 3 0 This can produce inequi-
ties because taxpayers who happen to invest in tax-favored
assets face a lower tax burden and receive a higher aftertax
rate of return than taxpayers who invest in similar tax-penal-
ized assets. 31 Additionally, to the extent that capitalization
does not eliminate the advantage of tax preferences to inves-
tors, investors who invest in tax-favored assets effectively
receive a windfall from the government without any obvious
benefit to society. 1 2
To illustrate, consider what would happen if the gov-
ernment created a special tax exemption for the interest on
bonds issued by XYZ Corporation ("XYZ"). 1 Assume that
XYZ will issue a bond that pays $100 in interest annually in
perpetuity. Assume further that similar taxable bonds offer a
pretax rate of return of 10% and that all investors pay tax at
a flat rate of 50%. Given these assumptions, the aftertax rate
of return on taxable bonds is 5%.
If XYZ's bond were not exempt from tax, we would expect
it to sell for $1,000. At that price, the bond's aftertax rate of
return would equal 5%, which is the aftertax rate of return
available on similar bonds. Because of the tax exemption,
however, investors will bid up the price of XYZ's bond. If cap-
ital markets were perfect, the price of the XYZ bond would
double to $2,0 00.134 At that price, the bond would yield 5%,
so investors would be indifferent between it and similar tax-
able bonds. If this were to happen, an investor who bought
the bond would in effect not benefit from the tax exemption
because the bond's price would have increased sufficiently to
ensure that the investor received only the normal 5% return.
In other words, the value of the tax exemption would be capi-
talized into the price of the bond. 1 35
129. Eg., BLTTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 107, 3.3.3; CHIRELSTELN, supra note
124, at 431-32; Yale II, supra note 114, at 551-52; Johnson, supra note 121,
at 1036-38.
130. Hg., BLTTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 107, 3.3.3; CHIRELSTELN, supra note
124, at 431-32; Yale 11, supra note 114, at 551-52; Johnson, supra note 121,
at 1036-38.
131. See, e.g., BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 107,1 3.3.3; CIREISTEIN, supra note
124, at 431-32; Johnson, supra note 121, at 1036-38; Yale II, supra note 114,
at 551-52.
132. Hg., BLTTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 107, 3.3.3; CHIRELSTELN, supra note
124, at 431-32; Johnson, supra note 121, at 1036-38; seealso Boris 1. Bittker,
Equity Efficiency and Income Tax Theory: Do Misallocations Drive Out Inequi-
ties?, 16 S.AN DIEGO L. REV. 73 5, 743-44 (1979).
133. 'The example in the text is based on examples found in BIrrKrR & LOKKEN,
supra note 101, 3.3.3 and CHIIRELSTEIN, supra note 124, at 427-32.
134. This conclusion assumes that investors expect that the government will not
change the tax rate or repeal the tax exemption. It also assumes that creation of
the tax exemption for XYZ's bonds has no effect on the pretax return on other
bonds.
135. See, e.g., BIrrKrR & LOKKEN, supra note 107, 3.3.3; CHIRELSTELN, supra
note 124, at 430-3 1. If the tax exemption is fully capitalized, XYZ receives the
entire benefit. To see why, recognize that without the exemption, XYZ could
have borrowed $2,000 only if it had paid $200 in interest annually. In that
case, the investor receiving the $200 in interest would have kept $100 and paid
the remaining $100 to the government as tax. Because of the tax exemption,
however, the government loses $100 in revenue, and XYZ can borrow $2,000
while paying only $100 in annual interest, not $200. Tlhus, the exemption is a
subsidy provided by the government to XYZ, with no benefit to the investor.
See, e.g., BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 107, 3.3.3; CHIREISTEIN, supra note
124, at 427- 32.
But if we make the example more realistic by assuming
that, for whatever reason, the tax exemption is not fully
capitalized, 1 6 the result changes significantly. For example,
if the price of the XYZ bond increases to $1,500, not $2,000,
then an investor who purchases the bond will earn an after-
tax return of 6.7%, not 5%. In effect, the government pro-
vides the investor with what amounts to a windfall, 13 7 which
arguably is unfair because the government receives nothing
in exchange. 38 Put differently, why should an investor who
happens to invest in a tax-favored asset such as the XYZ bond
earn a higher aftertax return than an investor who invests in
a similar tax-penalized asset?39
In sum, capital income neutrality has broad support
because a neutral tax does not distort investment choices.
Generally, neutrality is both fair and efficient. A tax imposed
on economic income is neutral because it extends to all capi-
tal income. This suggests that as a tax policy matter, firms
should be taxed when they receive free carbon permits if
those permits constitute economic income.
C. The Tax Exclusion for Free Permits as a Non-
Neutral Tax Preference
Emissions permits are valuable assets, so a firm that
receives them for free has economic income and arguably
should have to include the permits in income for tax pur-
poses. This Section will show that a tax exclusion for free
permits creates a tax preference that deviates from neutrality.
This tax preference may interfere with environmental pol-
icY 40 and is potentially unfair. The next Section will consider
whether, despite these concerns, a tax preference for free per-
mits can be justified.
As discussed in the previous Section, tax preferences can
distort investors' behavior, and a number of commentators
have pointed out that the tax exclusion for sulfur dioxide per-
mits may do just that. 14 1 In particular, one commentator has
used the Gary Brown theorem to show that the tax exclusion
creates an incentive to bank free permits and that this incen-
tive may increase the overall social cost of cap-and-trade. 1 4 2
According to the theorem, under certain conditions, per-
mitting a taxpayer to expense an investment (i.e., to deduct
its cost immediately) is equivalent to requiring capitaliza-
tion but exempting the income generated by the investment
136. One reason this could happen is that in reality, as opposed to the example,
investors purchasing tax-exempt bonds may face different marginal tax rates.
Thus, tax-exempt bonds may be priced to appeal to taxpayers who are not in
the top tax bracket. Eg., BIrrKrR & LOKKEN, supra note 107, 3.3.3; CHIRiE-
ISTEIN, supra note 124, at 4273 32.
137. Eg., BLTTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 107, 3.3.3; CHIREISTEIN, supra note
124, at 43o 031.
138. SeeJohnson, supra note 121, at 1038.
139. See Yale II, supra note 114, at 5 52.
140. See Yale I, supra note 28, at 543; Jonathan R. Nash, Taxes and the Success of
Non- Tax Market-Based Environmental Regulatory Regimes, in CRITICAL ISSUES
IN ENVIRONMENTAL TAxATION 73 5, 749 (Nathalie J. Chalifour et at. eds.,
2008).
141. See, e.g., Yale I, supra note 28, at 535, 543; Nash, supra note 140, at 749.
142. Yale 1, supra note 28, at 543. Yale does not address the topic of this Article, i.e.,
whether the government ought to tax free permits. instead, he accepts a tax
exclusion for free permits as given and explains the ramifications for environ-
mental policy.
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from tax. 143 The tax exclusion for free permits is similar to
expensing. 44 More precisely, excluding permits is similar to
including them in income and then expensing the amount
included .145 Because an exclusion is similar to expensing, if a
firm banks excluded permits, any subsequent appreciation in
their value is effectively exempt from tax. 146
To illustrate, assume that absent cap-and-trade, Firms A
and B would each emit one ton of carbon and have $100 of
net earnings during year 1. Assume for simplicity that each
firm pays tax at a flat rate of 40%. The government adopts
cap-and-trade and at the end of year 1, each firm receives a
free permit worth $100. Assume that for tax purposes, the
firms can exclude permits from income so that each firm has
a tax basis of zero in the permit that it receives.
Assume that A surrenders its permit to cover its year 1
emissions. Because it excluded the permit from income, A
receives no tax deduction for surrendering the permit, and it
pays $40 in tax on its $100 of net earnings. Assume that at
the end of year 1, A invests its aftertax income of $60. A then
sells its investment at the end of year 2 after the investment
appreciates in value by 10%. Table 1 illustrates the results
for A. It shows that at the end of year 2 A has $63.60 in cash
after paying taxes.
Table 1: Effect of Tax Exclusion
for Free Permits
Firm A Firm B
1. Yr. I taxable income $100 $0
2. Yr. I tax $40 $0
3. Yr. I investment $60 $100
4. Yr. 2 pretax sale proceeds $66 $110
5. Yr. 2 pretax appreciation $6 $10
6. Yr. 2 tax $2.40 $44
7. Yr. 2 aftertax cash (line 4 minus line 6) $63.60 $66
Now turn your attention to Firm B. Assume that instead
of surrendering its permit in year 1, B banks its free permit
and chooses to abate its emissions at a cost of $100. (Recall
from Part I that if the market for permits is efficient, the
marginal cost of abatement should equal the cost of a per-
mit. Thus, a permit price of $100 implies a marginal abate-
ment cost of $100.) Assuming that B's abatement costs are
deductible, 147 the deduction offsets B's net earnings of $100
and reduces the firm's taxable income to zero. So B pays no
tax in year 1.
143. E. Cary Brown, Business-Income Taxation and Investment Incentives, in IN-
COME,' EMPLOYMENT AND PUBLIC POiICY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ALVIN H.
HANSEN 300-416 (Lloyd A. Metzler et a]. eds., 1948). For a discussion of the
Cary Brown theorem and the conditions under which equivalence holds, see
GRAETZ & SCHENCK, supra note 14, at 298-301.
144. Yale I, supra note 28, at 544-45.
145. Id.
146. Id at 544-47.
141. B's abatement costs would be deductible business expenses unless they consti-
tute capital expenditures. See J.R.C. §§ 162, 263 (2006).
If permits appreciate at a rate of 10% (i.e., the same rate as
the investment that A purchased), the permit that B banked
will be worth $110 at the end of year 2. If it sells the permit,
B will have a gain of $110. (Because B excluded the permit
from income, it has a tax basis of zero.) Table 1 shows that
after paying tax on its gain, B is left with $66.
Line 7 of Table 1 shows that B has $2.40 more cash than
A at the end of year 2. The Gary Brown theorem explains
this result. The tax exclusion for free permits has the same
effect as including the permits in income and then expensing
them, and expensing provides a benefit similar to exempting
subsequent appreciation from tax. 148 In order to receive the
benefit of this exemption, a firm receiving free permits must
bank those permits. Because A did not bank its permit, it
does not receive the benefit of the exemption.
B, on the other hand, banked its permit. Thus, B ends up
in the same position in which it would have been if the fol-
lowing had occurred: (1) it included the permit in income,
producing $100 of taxable income; (2) it paid tax of $40 on
that income; (3) it invested the aftertax income of $60 in an
asset that appreciated in value by $6 (i.e., 10%) during year
2; and (4) it did not pay tax on the resulting appreciation.
Why does banking produce this result? Abating emissions
and banking the free permit allows B to defer payment of
$40 in tax on $100 of income. The tax is deferred for one
year from year 1 to year 2. Because of deferral, B receives
what amounts to an interest-free loan from the government
of $40. In effect, B invests the loan proceeds at an aftertax
rate of return of 6% for a profit of $2.40. At the end of year
2, B is better off than A by this amount because A did not
receive the interest-free loan. Instead, A had to pay $40 in tax
on its $100 of net earnings in year 1.
This analysis shows that an exclusion for free permits cre-
ates a tax preference for banking those permits .1 49 A and B
are identical except for the fact that A surrendered its permit
while B reduced emissions and banked its permit. Because
B banked its permit, the firm pays $40 less in tax in year 1
than does A. This tax preference for banking would not exist
if firms had to include free permits in income.
Another way to explain why a tax exclusion for free per-
mits favors banking is the lock-in effect. 50 If free permits
have no tax basis, a firm that sells them will pay tax on the
full amount of the sales proceeds. Zero basis effectively trans-
forms the income tax into an excise tax on the sale of permits.
Banking permits allows firms to defer the tax. Thus, firms
have an incentive to lock in their investment in free permits
and to refrain from selling those permits to other firms.
By creating an incentive to bank permits, the tax exclusion
for free permits may increase the cost of cap-and-trade. 5 1 If
the exclusion encourages firms to bank permits, the current
price of permits may rise relative to their future price. Given
that the price of permits reflects the marginal cost of abate-
ment, " [t] ax rules will warp the relative costs of abatement in
148. Yale 1, supra note 28, at 544-47.
149. Seid at54-8
150. Id. at 541.
151. Id. at 543.
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present and future periods, causing the present cost of abate-
ment to increase relative to future costs."15 2
The effect on permit price of the tax exclusion for free per-
mits is similar to the effect on the price of the XYZ bond
of the tax exemption discussed in the example in the pre-
vious Section. The tax exclusion for free permits effectively
exempts from tax any appreciation in the value of those per-
mits if the permits are banked.153 So the tax exclusion may
encourage firms to bank permits, which could cause the price
of permits to rise so that the tax exemption becomes capital-
ized into permit price. 15 4 If the tax exemption becomes fully
capitalized into permit price, firms will no longer have a tax
incentive to continue banking permits. On the other hand, if
capitalization is less than complete, the price of permits will
not increase enough to eliminate the tax advantage of bank-
ing. (This might happen, e.g., if holders of zero-basis permits
do not dominate the market.) In that case, firms that receive
and bank free permits may receive a windfall because the
aftertax return on the banked permits may be higher than
the aftertax return on similar investment opportunities. 1 5 5
In sum, a tax exclusion for free permits creates a tax pref-
erence for banking those permits. If tax-induced banking
increases the permit price, the overall cost of cap-and-trade
may increase. By contrast, if the tax preference for banking
is not fully capitalized in permit price, firms that receive and
bank free permits may experience a windfall. The next Sec-
tion considers whether this potential windfall is justifiable.
D. A Tax Exclusion as Rough justice
Despite the fact that the free receipt of valuable permits
produces economic income, recipient firms may argue that
a tax exclusion provides a certain rough justice. The argu-
ment proceeds as follows. The adoption of a cap-and-trade
program may cause some of the assets of certain firms to
decline in value. 15 6 (These transition losses may occur, e.g., if
a firm is expected to incur costs that it cannot pass on to its
customers.)157 If the income tax were imposed on economic
income, firms could immediately deduct transition losses,
and this deduction would at least partially offset any income
resulting from free permits. The problem is that under the
actual income tax (as opposed to a tax imposed on economic
income) firms cannot immediately deduct transition losses
because of the realization requirement. 158 As a result, any
152. Id.
153. See id. at 543-48.
154. Id at 547-48.
155. Arguably, the tax exclusion for free permits will create a windfall for firms even
if the resulting tax exemption for subsequent appreciation is fully capitalized
into permit price. As discussed infra Part ILE, the receipt of free permits by
firms may itself constitute a windfall. To the extent that capitalization of the
tax exemption makes permits more valuable, it increases the amount of this
windfall.
156. See, e.g., SHIFTING THE COST BURDEN, supra note 17, at 3; Burtraw & Palmer,
supra note 27, at 825-28.
151. SHIFTING THE COST BURDEN, sutpra note 17, at 3.
158. As a result of the realization requirement, unrealized gains and losses generally
are not recognized for tax purposes until the occurrence of a realization event,
e.g., a sale. Eg., J. MARTIN B'URKE & MICHAEL K. FIEL, TAxATInN flF INDI-
VIDUAL INCOME 28 (8th ed. 2007); see also I.R.C. § 1001 (2006); Treas. Reg.§
1. 100 11 1(a) (as amended in 2007).
potential windfall resulting from a tax exclusion for free
permits is arguably justified as a mechanism to mitigate the
overtaxation that results from the inability to immediately
deduct unrealized transition losses. 59 Stated differently,
if a firm's transition losses equal or exceed the value of the
permits it receives, then on net, the firm has no economic
income as a result of cap-and-trade. Instead, the free permits
effectively compensate the firm for losses it would otherwise
sustain.
This rough justice argument, however, suffers from two
significant flaws. The first flaw is somewhat technical but
still worth noting. Even if free permits merely compensate
firms for transition losses, a tax exclusion that results in the
permits having zero tax basis does not seem appropriate. If
permits constitute compensation then they are analogous to
a property damage award and arguably should be treated as a
recovery of capital, or more precisely, a recovery for injury to
capital. 1 6 0 The tax consequences of treating free permits as a
recovery of capital would mimic the consequences of includ-
ing the permits in income and simultaneously deducting any
losses on the firm's other assets, except that the deduction
would be limited to the lesser of the value of the permits or
the tax basis of the other assets. In other words, receipt of
the permits would effectively be tax-free to the extent of the
firm's tax basis in its other (non-permit) assets .16 1 The permits
themselves would take a basis equal to their value, and the
firm would reduce the basis of its other assets by the value of
the permits (but not below zero). 16 2
To illustrate, assume that Firm X owns assets that are
worth $1,000 immediately before the government unexpect-
edly adopts a carbon cap-and-trade program in which X is a
covered firm. 163 Assume that if the government auctioned all
permits, the value of X's assets would drop to $900 because
X's additional costs (including permit costs) would reduce the
firm's expected profits. This could occur if investors expected
that X would be unable to pass on all of its additional costs to
its customers. Assume that instead of auctioning all permits,
the government gives X, at no charge, permits worth $100.
X receives the permits in the year the government adopts the
program. 64
159. The firms would be "overtaxed" in the sense that the realization requirement
causes their taxable income to exceed their economic income.
160. See Raytheon Prod. Corp. v. Cormmr, 144 F.2d 110, 113-14 (1st Cir. 1944)
(stating that a damage award is treated as a tax-free recovery of capital to the
extent of the taxpayer's basis in the damaged property); State Fish Corp. v.
Comm'r, 48 T.C. 465, 472-73 (1967) (same); Sager Glove Corp. v. Comm'r,
36TC. 1173, 1180 (1961) (same).
161. See, e.g., Raytheon Prod. Corp., 144 F.2d at 113-14; State Fish Corp., 48T.C.
at 472-73; Sager Glove Corp., 36TC. at 1180.
162. See J.R.C. § 1016(a) (2006); Inaja Land Co., Ltd. v. Comm'r, 9 T.C. 727,
135-36 (1941); Rev. Rul. 70-510, 1910-2 C.B. 159 (holding that amounts
received for granting a perpetual easement to flood the taxpayer's property re-
duced the basis of the property).
163. Assuming that the program is adopted by surprise avoids the complication of
a gradual decline in the value of Xs assets that would likely occur as the esti-
mated probability of cap-and-trade's adoption increased.
164. Instead of receiving all of its permits in the year the program is adopted, a firm
might receive a streamn of permits over several years. Receipt of a stream of
permits complicates the analysis without materially altering the conclusion, so
for simplicity I assume immediate lump-sum receipt.
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Because the government gives X permits worth $100,
adoption of the program has no effect on the firm's aggre-
gate value. The firm's old assets, i.e., the assets it owned prior
to adoption of the program, are now worth only $900. (To
understand why, imagine that after receiving the permits, X
sold its old assets but kept the permits. The buyer would not
pay more than $900 for the old assets because after it pur-
chased the assets, the buyer would still have to buy permits to
cover emissions.) The permits the firm receives, however, are
worth $100. So the firm's aggregate value remains $1,000.
In this example, the free permits are just sufficient to com-
pensate the firm for the transition losses it sustains on its old
assets. On net, the firm has no economic income or loss, so in
a tax imposed on economic income, adoption of the program
would have no net effect on taxable income.
This does not mean, however, that for tax purposes, X
should exclude the permits and give them a tax basis of zero,
as it would if the tax exclusion in Revenue Ruling 92-16
applied. 165 Instead, in theory at least, X should be taxed as
follows. Since the permits are valuable property, X should
include them in income and give them a tax basis of $100.
Conversely, because the firm's old assets have declined in
value by $100, the firm should deduct this loss immediately.
Assuming that prior to the adoption of the program, the
firm's old assets had an aggregate tax basis of $1,000 (i.e.,
their value at that time), the loss deduction would reduce the
aggregate tax basis of the old assets to $900 (i.e., their value
after adoption of the program) .16 6
The result is that the income from the permits and the
deduction for the loss on the old assets offset one another,
producing no net effect on taxable income. Of course,
instead of including the permits in income and allowing an
offsetting deduction, the same outcome could be achieved by
treating the receipt of the permits as a recovery of capital that
reduces the basis of the old assets. In effect, X simply needs
to transfer $100 of basis from its old assets to the permits.
As this example makes clear, an analogy between free per-
mits and a property damage award does not provide support
for the tax exclusion created by Revenue Ruling 92-16. The
tax consequences of treating free permits similar to a prop-
erty damage award would generally be similar to including
the permits in income and simultaneously deducting an off-
setting loss on the recipient firm's other assets. By contrast,
Revenue Ruling 92-16 effectively requires that for tax pur-
poses, firms simply ignore permits that they receive for free,
at least until those permits are sold. 16 7 These two approaches
differ because the former approach results in permits that
have a tax basis equal to their value at the time of receipt,
whereas the latter results in permits that have no tax basis.
This difference is important because, as the previous Section
demonstrated, taxpayers have an incentive to bank permits
that have no basis, and tax-induced banking may increase the
overall cost of cap-and-trade. This tax preference for bank-
ing, however, would not arise if free permits were treated as a
165. Rev. Rul. 92-16,1992-1 C.B. 15.
166. See J.R.C. § 10 1 6(a) (2006).
167. Rev. Rul. 92-16, 1992-1 C.B. 15.
recovery of capital and took a basis equal to their fair market
value.
The second flaw with the rough justice argument is more
fundamental. The argument rests substantially on the claim
that free permits merely compensate firms for transition
losses. Returning to the example, if cap-and-trade had not
caused X's old assets to decline in value, then the free per-
mits would have increased the value of the firm from $1,000
to $1,100. In other words, the permits would have triggered
$100 of economic income with no offsetting loss. In that case,
no reason would exist not to tax the permits upon receipt.
The next Section argues that the claim that free permits will
merely compensate firms for transition losses is questionable.
E. Windfalls Resulting from Free Permits
This Section shows that free permits may do more than just
compensate firms for transition losses. The permits can actu-
ally increase the value of recipient firms relative to their value
prior to adoption of cap-and-trade. 1 68 As a result, the argu-
ment for not taxing the permits upon receipt is difficult to
sustain.
Subsection 1 describes in general terms how a cap-and-
trade program with free permits can make firms better off
than they would be if the program did not exist. Subsec-
tion 2 focuses specifically on firms in the electricity genera-
tion industry and explains how a cap-and-trade program will
likely affect the value of those firms. I focus on the electricity
generation industry because its members will be responsible
for a large share of emissions abatement 16 9 and, as a result,
will be among the candidates for free permits. 170 Subsection
3 explains that because the government may allocate permits
for any reason it wants, there is no assurance that permits
will simply provide compensation. As a result, the govern-
ment should tax free permits upon receipt. Subsection 4
argues that firms should be required to include free permits
in income despite the fact that doing so creates some poten-
tial for overtaxation in certain instances.
I . Covered Firms Generally
A seemingly intuitive argument can be made that a cap-and-
trade program cannot increase the value of covered firms
even if those firms receive free permits. 17 1 This argument
proceeds as follows. Cap-and-trade places a new regulatory
burden on covered firms, i-e-, the requirement that the firms
surrender permits to cover emissions. Free permits reduce
this burden, but only partially. Because firms will not receive
all of the permits they wish to surrender, they will still incur
168. Burtraw & Palmer, supra note 27, at 819 (noting that "free allocation of allow-
ances ... may overcompensate producers for their loss in value").
169. Id. at 823.
170. The Waxman-Markey bill allocates permits to certain coal-fired power plants.
American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111Ith Cong.§
783(c) (2009).
171. This argument is similar to an argument that was used to justify the tax exclu-
sion for free sulfur dioxide permits. S'ee Letter from George B. Jiavaras and
Donald E. Rocap, Kirkland & Ellis, to Glenn A. Carrington, Internal Revenue
Service (Sept. 18, 1992), reprinted in 208 TAx NOTEs 46 (1992).
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substantial costs, including the cost of purchasing additional
permits. Granted, the government could increase the pro-
gram's regulatory burden by auctioning permits. But its fail-
ure to do so does not put covered firms in a better position
than they were in before the program existed. A grant by the
government of limited pollution rights in place of previously
unlimited pollution rights does not make covered firms bet-
ter o ff. 17 2 In other words, free permits make covered firms
better off than if they had to purchase permits at auction.
But free permits do not make the firms better off than they
were before they were required to surrender permits in the
first place.
The problem with this argument is that it assumes that
because a cap-and-trade program limits the rights of cov-
ered firms it must also reduce their value. This assumption is
incorrect. For example, a program in which the government
auctioned all permits would limit the rights of covered firms
and impose significant costs, but it would not necessarily
reduce the value of all of those firms .17 3
The reason is that many firms will be able to raise prices
and pass on a substantial portion of their costs to their cus-
tomers. Additionally, many firms that own carbon-intensive
assets also own low-carbon assets that will actually increase
in value when the government adopts cap-and-trade. 74 This
will happen because the program will increase prices of the
goods produced using those assets without imposing a pro-
portionate increase in costs. 1 Given that the value of all
covered firms would not necessarily decline even if the gov-
ernment auctioned all permits, a substantial risk exists that
giving permits away will overcompensate many firms for any
transition losses that they do in fact incur. 76
It may seem that free permits should benefit consumers,
not firms, because firms that receive permits for free will not
be forced to raise prices. This view, however, is inaccurate.
Even if firms receive permits for free, using permits in the
production process involves an opportunity cost. 17 7 A firm
that uses its permits forgoes the revenue from selling them.
Firms make pricing decisions based on opportunity costs. 178
In general, firms will increase prices to reflect the opportu-
nity cost of using permits even if the firms received those per-
mits for free. 179 As a result, free permits generally will benefit
172. See id.
173. See Stavins I, supra note 43, at 305; Burtraw & Palmer, supra note 27, at 826-
27; Burtraw et al., supra note 85, at 56-57.
174. See Stavins I, supra note 43, at 305; Burtraw et al., supra note 85, at 56-57.
175. See Stavins 1, supra note 43, at 305; Burtraw et al., supra note 85, at 56-57.
176. Burtraw & Palmer, supra note 27, at 822 ("The award of free allowances to
producers is a blunt instrument for compensation [that] tends to reward win-
ners as well as losers.").
177. TRADE-OFFS, supra note 22, at 5; Viard, supra note 4, at 616-17.
178. TRADnE-OFFS, supra note 22, at 5; Viard, supra note 4, at 616-17.
179. See, e.g., TRADE-OFFS, supra note 22, at 5; Viard, supra note 4, at 616-17.
Indeed, these price increases will further the purpose of cap-and-trade by giv-
ing consumers an incentive to reduce consumption of carbon-intensive goods.
Viard, supra note 4, at 619-20. Note that prices will not necessarily increase
to reflect the full cost of permits, whether those costs represent explicit costs or
opportunity costs. See, e.g., id at 616-17. In other words, firms will not be able
to raise prices enough to pass on all permit costs to consumers. This does not,
however, alter the conclusion in the text that free allocation of permits gener-
ally will not stop firms from raising prices and will therefore benefit sharehold-
ers, not consumers. For a discussion of why some electricity generators may
the firms that receive them (or more precisely, the sharehold-
ers of those firms) and not consumers. 80
This partly explains why allocating permits for free can
significantly overcompensate covered firms for any transi-
tion losses. If the government auctions permits, in effect,
money flows from consumers to the government, which cap-
tures permit value. This results from a three-step process: (1)
money flows from consumers (who pay higher prices); (2) to
covered firms (which purchase permits); and (3) then to the
Treasury. But if the government gives permits away for free,
the third step is omitted. In other words, firms capture per-
mit value because they charge their customers for permits
that they themselves receive for free. 81 As a result, free per-
mits can produce windfalls for the firms that receive them . 18 2
not be able to pass on all of their permit costs to their customers, see infra
Part II.E.2.
180. TRADE-OFFS, supra note 22, at 5; Viard, supra note 4, at 616-17. The analysis
in the text assumes that permits are given to firms based on historical measures
over which the firms have no control, e.g., historical emissions. If that is the
case, then permit allocations will not affect production decisions and will not
result in lower prices but will instead increase profits. See, e.g., Stavins 1, supra
note 43, at 317 n.96, 319-20.
It is possible, however, that the government will update allocations pe-
riodically based on output. For example, the Waxman-Markey bill includes
output-based updating for some allocations. See, e.g., American Clean Energy
and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111lth Cong. § 783(c) (2009) (using
ouitput-hbased uipdating for ailocations to merchant coal generatrs). Output-
based updating transforms allocations into a production subsidy, which may
dampen the price increases that would otherwise result from cap-and-trade.
EVALuATiON OF CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAMS, supra note 43, at 12-15; Stavins
1, supra note 43, at 317 n.96. In that case, shareholders and consumers will
likely share the benefits of freely allocated permits. EVALUATION OF' CAP-AND-
TRADE PROGRAMS, supra note 43, at 12-15; Stavins 1, supra note 43, at 320
n. 102.
But even if consumers receive some benefit, output-based updating is prob-
lematic. If the government uses free permits to keep prices of certain goods and
services artificially low, it will reduce the incentive to conserve. See, e.g., EvAu-
ATION OF CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAMS, supra note 43, at 12-15; Stavins I, supra
note 43, at 317 n.96; Viard, supra note 4, at 619-20. As a result, emissions
abatement will shift from the subsidized sectors of the economy to unsubsi-
dized sectors where it may be more expensive. Eg., Viard, supra note 4, at
619-20. The net result may be an inefficient subsidy that increases the overall
cost of cap-and-trade. Id. Consumers will save money on subsidized goods but
as a result, may spend even more money on unsubsidized goods. Id.
In short, the use of output-based updating to benefit consumers is likely
to prove counterproductive. So if the government ultimately uses free permits
in this way, it may be best to tax those permits in order to reduce the amount
of the inefficient subsidy. Output-based updating creates problems similar to
those created by the allocation of permits to LDCs. For a more complete dis-
cussion of these problems, see infra Part IV.
There is one caveat to this analysis. Output-based updating may be benefi-
cial for allocations to "trade-vulnerable" industries (although this is controver-
sial). See infra note 328.
181. Another way of describing why firms benefit from free permits is as follows.
By forcing firms to limit production of carbon-intensive goods, cap-and-trade
effectively organizes firms into a cartel, which increases prices and creates the
potential for economic rents. Bovenberg & Goulder, supra note 73, at 48-49,
56-60; Lawrence H. Goulder, Mitigating the Adverse Impacts of C02 Abate-
ment Policies on Energy-Intensive Industries 2 (Res. for the Future, Working Pa-
per No. 02-22, 2002). The potential rents are reflected in permit value. If the
government auctions permits, it transforms the potential rents into revenue. If
the government gives away permits, it allows firms to retain the rents.
182. Yet another way to think about this is to recognize that a cap-and-trade pro-
gram in which permits are auctioned is similar to a carbon tax, the burden of
which falls primarily on consumers because it increases the prices of carbon-
intensive goods and services. See Viard, sup ra note 4, at 613-17. But a cap-and-
trade program with free permits for covered firms is similar to a carbon tax in
which the government allows firms to keep the tax revenue. See id. Hence the
conclusion that free permits can make firms substantially better off than they
would be if the cap-and-trade program did not exist.
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Empirical evidence from the European Union ("EU")
supports this conclusion. 8 3 The EU has a carbon cap-and-
trade program in which most permits are given away for free
to covered firms.18 4 Economists have concluded that many
firms have likely reaped windfalls precisely because the firms
have raised prices despite the fact that they do not have to pay
for most of their permits. 8 5
2. Firms in the Electricity Generation Industry
To better illustrate how a carbon cap-and-trade program
with free permits may increase the value of covered firms,
this Subsection explains the likely effects of the program on
the electricity generation industry. This industry is respon-
sible for 40% of carbon emissions, and analysts estimate that
it could account for 70% of emissions reduction under a car-
bon cap-and-trade program .18 6 Cap-and-trade will impose
significant costs on many power plants, so members of the
industry will likely lobby for free permits. 18 7 As we will see,
a substantial risk exists that any allocation scheme will over-
compensate many firms for their potential transition losses. 88
This Subsection focuses specifically on what I will refer to
as unregulated generators, 89 which are firms that sell electric-
ity on competitive markets and that, unlike rate-regulated
utilities, 19 0 are not subject to rate regulation. 91 The effects of
cap-and-trade on the value of unregulated generators will be
ambiguous. 1 9 2 If the government wishes to compensate these
firms for transition losses, it will be difficult to estimate those
losses (if any) and to determine the appropriate amount of
compensation. 93
To illustrate why, consider a cap-and-trade program in
which electricity generators are covered firms. Market forces
183. See Jos Sijm et al., C02 Cost Pass Through and Windfall Profits in the Power Sec-
tor, 6 CLIMATE Poi'y 49, 67 (2006); TRADE-OFFS, supra note 22, at 5.
184. Sijm etral., supra note 183, at 49.
185. See id. at 49, 67; TRADE-OFFS, supra note 22, at 5.
186. Burtraw & Palmer, supra note 27, at 823.
187. As previously noted, the Waxmnan-Markey bill allocates free permits to certain
coal-fired power piants. American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009,
H.R. 2454, 111 th Cong. § 783(c) (2009).
188. Burtraw & Palmer, supra note 21, at 826-28; see also Burtraw et al., supra note
85, at 56-57 (noting that some utilities may profit from cap-and-trade even if
permits are auctioned).
189. The Waxman-Markey bill allocates permits to merchant coal generators, which
are unregulated generators. See H. R. 2454 § 783 (c).
190. 1 focus on unregulated generators because rate-setting bodies will likely adjust
the rates of rate-regulated utilities so that the utilities recover any additional
costs and do not suffer significant transition losses. Burtraw & Palmer, supra
note 27, at 824. So the government has no reason to use free permits to com-
pensate rate-regulated utilities. As discussed infra Part IV, the Waxmnan-Markey
bill does give free permits to LDCs, the rates of which are regulated, but the
bill requires LDCs to use the permits to benefit their customers. H.R. 2454§
783(b).
191. For a description of unregulated generators, see ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S.
DEP'T OF ENERGY, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF THE ELECTRIC POWER IN-
DUSTRY 2000: AN UPDATE 21-24 (2000) [hereinafter ELECTRIC POWER INDUS-
TRY 2000]; Paul L. Joskow, The Difficult Transition to Competitive Electricity
Markets in the United States, in ELECTRICITY DEREGULATION: CHOICES AND
CHALLENGES 3i, 44-49 (James M. Griffin & Steven L. Puller eds., 2005).
192. Burtraw & Palmer, supra note 27, at 826-27; see also Burtraw et al., supra note
85, at 56-57 (noting that cap-and-trade may increase the revenues of some
utilities by more than it increases costs).
193. See Burtraw & Palmer, supra note 27, at 821-45 (discussing the difficulties in
estimating losses at the firm level).
will determine the effects of the program on firms that sell
power in competitive markets. In competitive wholesale
markets, prices generally are set based on generators' offers,
which are accepted in order from the lowest to highest until
demand is met. 19 4 The market clearing price is the price of
the marginal generator, i.e., the highest offer sufficient to
satisfy demand. 1 All generators receive the market clearing
price, even if they submitted lower offers .1 96
Because the marginal generator sets the price of electricity,
prices in competitive markets depend on the marginal gen-
erator's operating costs. 97 This means that prices generally
will increase to reflect any costs that cap-and-trade imposes
on the marginal generator, including any permit costs. 98
Because of this, the effects of cap-and-trade on other genera-
tion facilities will largely depend on whether their additional
costs per unit of electricity generated are more or less than
those of the marginal generator. 99 If they are more, the addi-
tional costs will cut into profits and reduce the value of the
facility.200 If they are less, the facility may increase in value
because electricity prices will increase by more than any
additional costs. 201
This raises an important question: which facilities are the
marginal generators in the various markets for electricity?
The answer varies from market to market and depends on
the time of day and year, but very often, the marginal genera-
tor in a particular market is a power plant fueled by natural
gas .2 0 2 A few details about the electricity industry will assist
in explaining why. Electricity cannot be stored, so it must
be generated and consumed at virtually the same time .2 03
Also, demand varies throughout each day and throughout
the year.20 4 As a result, some generation capacity sits idle dur-
ing off-peak hours (e.g., nighttime) .2 5 Because of their high
capital costs and for technical reasons, some power plants
(e.g., many nuclear and coal-fired power plants) operate at
long-intervals or almost constantly.206 These baseload plants
operate during both peak and off-peak hours .20 7 Other power
plants (e.g., many gas-fired power plants) are brought online
194. See SUSAN E TIERNEY ET AL., UNIF1ORM-PRICING VERSUS PAY-AS-BID IN
WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY MARKETS 1-2, 7-8 (200 8).
195. See i
196. See id.
197. Burtraw & Palmer, supra note 27, at 824.
198. See id; Anne E. Smith et al., Implications of Trading Implementation Design for
Equity-Efficiency Trade-Offi in Carbon Permit Allocations 4 n.4 (Charles River
Assocs., Discussion Paper, 2002). Sijm, Neuhoff, and Chen, however, discuss
several reasons why the price of electricity might not increase sufficiently to
fully reflect the permit costs of the marginal generator. Sijm et al., supra note
183, atl 5152.
199. See Burtraw & Palmer, supra note 27, at 829; Smith et al., supra note 198, at 4
n.4.
200. See Burtraw & Palmer, supra note 27, at 829; Smith et al., supra note 198, at 4
n.4.
201. See Burtraw & Palmer, supra note 21, at 829; Burtraw et al., supra note 85, at
56-57.
202. See Burtraw et al., supra note 85, at 56; Burtraw & Palmer, supra note 21, at
829; Smith et al., supra note 198, at 4 n.4.
203. Joskow, supra note 19 1, at 40.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. See ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY 2000lf, supra note 191, at 9-i0 (noting that
baseload plants usually operate continuously).
207. See i
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to meet peak demand .2 08 The nuclear and coal-fired baseload
plants often have lower operating costs (primarily because of
lower fuel costs) than the peakload gas-fired power plants .2 0 9
This means that in competitive markets, a gas-fired power
plant is often the marginal generator that sets the price of
electricity (at least during peak hours) .2 10
Because gas-fired power plants often set the price in
competitive markets, economists expect that many of these
facilities will be able to shift a substantial portion of their
additional costs to their customers . 2 11 This means that in
many cases, cap-and-trade's effects on the profits of coal-fired
power plants and other generation facilities will depend on
whether those facilities' costs per unit of electricity generated
increase by more or less than the costs of gas-fired power
plants .212
On the one hand, natural gas emits about half as much
carbon as coal per unit of electricity generated . 2 13 This means
that if a gas-fired power plant is the marginal generator in a
particular market, prices will likely increase enough to allow
coal-fired power plants to recover roughly half of their addi-
tional costs. 214
On the other hand, low-carbon facilities, e.g., nuclear,
hydroelectric, and wind facilities, will have no or low addi-
tional costs. 2 15 These facilities will experience windfalls as the
price of the electricity they produce rises much faster than
their costs.216
In general, economists expect that a cap-and-trade pro-
gram in which permits are auctioned would have the follow-
ing effects on values at the facility level.217 Many coal-fired
power plants would likely decline in value as increased costs
cut into profits .2 18 Low-carbon facilities would likely substan-
tially increase in value .21 9 To the extent that they serve as the
marginal generators in their respective markets, the effects
on gas-fired power plants generally would likely be less dra-
matic than the effects on other types of facilities. 2 2 0
While the effects on facility values are of interest, what
matters for purposes of this Article are the effects of cap-
and-trade on values at the firm level. Firms, not facilities,
208. See id.
209. See Burtraw & Palmer, supra note 27, at 829; Burtraw et al., supra note 85, at
56.
210. See Burtraw & Palmer, supra note 27, at 829; Burtraw et at., supra note 85, at
56; Smith et al., supra note 198, at 4 n.4.
211. See Burtraw & Palmer, supra note 27, at 829; Burtraw et at., supra note 85, at
56; Smith et al., supra note 198, at 4 n.4.
212. See Burtraw & Palmer, supra note 27, at 829; Burtraw et al., supra note 85, at
56; Smith et al., supra note 198, at 4 n.4; Sijm et al., supra note 183, at 52-53.
213. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY, EMISSIONS OF GREENHOUSE
GASES IN THE UNITED STATES 2000, at 140 (2001); Smith et al., supra note
198, at 4 n.4.
214. Smith et al., supra note 198, at 4 n.4.
215. See Burtraw et al., supra note 85, at 56.
216. See Burtraw & Palmer, supra note 27, at 829; Burtraw et al., supra note 85, at
56.
211. By facility level, I mean at the generation facility or power plant level, as op-
posed to at the firm level.
218. See Burtraw & Palmer, supra note 27, at 829; Burtraw et al., supra note 85, at
55; Smith et al., supra note 198, at 4 n.4.
219. See Burtraw & Palmer, supra note 27, at 829; Burtraw et al., supra note 85, at
55; Smith et al., supra note 198, at 4 n.4.
220. See Burtraw & Palmer, supra note 27, at 829; Burtraw et al., supra note 85, at
55; Smith et al., supra note 198, at 4 n.4.
serve as taxable units. The argument that free permits should
be excluded from income for tax purposes is substantially
weakened unless cap-and-trade imposes transition losses at
the firm level.
Cap-and-trade's potential effect on firm values can be dif-
ficult to determine because many firms own a portfolio of
generation facilities .2 21 As we have seen, some facilities will
increase in value and others will decrease in value. The net
effect on a particular firm will depend on its energy gen-
eration portfolio. In a study that estimates cap-and-trade's
effects on facility and firm values (assuming that the govern-
ment auctions all permits) researchers concluded that because
many firms have diversified energy generation portfolios, net
losses at the firm level could be substantially less than gross
losses at the facility level . 22 2 Some firms may actually increase
in value .2 23
This research substantially weakens any argument that
free permits will merely compensate firms for transition
losses. Given that some firms will increase in value even if
permits are auctioned, a significant possibility exists that free
permits will overcompensate at least some firms and increase
their value above what it would be if the government did not
adopt cap-and-trade . 2 2 4
3. The Government's Motives in Allocating
Permits and the Procedure for Determining
Transition Losses
The fact that free permits can increase the value of firms
weakens the argument against taxing the permits upon
receipt. Free permits are not similar to an award for prop-
erty damage because we have no guarantee that the permits
will simply restore the taxpayer to the position it was in prior
to the adoption of cap-and-trade. This point is particularly
forceful when you consider that in allocating permits, the
government may have mixed motives. It may allocate permits
to compensate for transition losses, but it also may allocate
permits for any number of other reasons, including the desire
to placate powerful interest groups .2 25 In this respect, con-
22 1. See Burtraw & Palmer, supra note 27, at 826-27.
222. Id. at 825-21.
223. Id; see also Stavins I, supra note 43, at 305.
224. The Waxmnan-Markey bill contains a provision that allows the Administrator of
the Environmental Protection Agency, in consultation with the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission, to adjust permit allocations to merchant coal genera-
tors if the Administrator makes an affirmative finding that those generators
are receiving windfall profits. See American Clean Energy and Security Act of
2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 783(c)(5) (2009). It is not clear, however,
how the Administrator will make such a finding and whether the provision
will be vigorously enforced. Given the delicate political balance that the bill's
complex allocation scheme achieves and the influence of the special interest
groups involved, the Administrator may be reluctant to tamper with permit
allocations. Cf Peter Behr, Power Industry Infighting Heats Up Over Climate
Legislation, CLIMATEWIRE, July 16, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.
com/cwire/2009/07/1 6/1 6climatewire-power-industry infighting-heats-
up-over dim-38477.html ("Some industry experts said that the Federal En-
ergy Regulatory Commission could, in theory, intervene if [generators] were
taking unfair advantage of the allotment program. But such an effort could run
into the complex ownership arrangements that the [generators] have for their
various coal, nuclear and renewable generation resources, they added.").
225. See, e.g., Broder, supra note 3, at A20 (discussing the manner in which free
permits were used to secure passage of the Waxman-Markey bill).
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trast free permits with a property damage award that results
from litigation in which the defendant has a strong incentive
to ensure that the award is not excessive.
Even if the government's motives were pure, determin-
ing which firms will suffer losses and the amount of those
losses will be difficult. For example, a good faith attempt to
determine losses at the firm level in the electricity generation
industry might require that the government painstakingly
net gains at some facilities against losses at others . 2 26 More-
over, the researchers who have attempted to estimate firm-
level losses note that the estimates are not precise and depend
on numerous variables .2 2 7 For example, delays in implement-
ing the cap-and-trade program (or slowly phasing it in) could
substantially reduce transition losses .2 28  Delays will give
firms time to realize the value of existing carbon-intensive
assets and to adjust their investments accordingly.229
Because estimating losses is so difficult, it seems unlikely
that the government will be able to accurately target allo-
cations only to those firms that might lose value .23 0 Over-
compensation seems especially likely given the fact that the
allocation scheme will result from a highly politicized process
in which numerous interest groups vie for billions of dollars
worth of permits . 2 1' During this process, firms have a signifi-
cant incentive to exaggerate potential losses and understate
potential gains .23 2
4. The Potential for Overtaxation
This Section has described in detail the very real possibility
that free permits may make at least some recipient firms bet-
ter off than they would be if the government did not adopt
climate change legislation. On the basis of this analysis, I
conclude that free permits should be taxed upon receip t.233
Nevertheless, I acknowledge that some firms receiving free
permits would otherwise suffer transition losses so that at
226. See Burtraw & Palmer, supra note 27, at 837.
221. Id. at 821-22.
228. Id at 820-21.
229. Id.
230. Id at 823 (" [Clonsiderations regarding the difficulty of targeting compensa-
tion to its intended recipients ... might move policy makers away from free
allocation.").
23 1. Cf Paul L. Joskow & Richard Schmalensee, The Political Economy of Ma rket-
Based Environmental Policy: The US. Acid Rain Program, 41 J. L. & EcoN.
31, 38 (1998) ("Because emissions permits are valuable and decisions about
their distribution are made by political institutions, these decisions are likely
to be highly politicized, reflecting rent-seeking behavior and interest group
politics.").
232. See Burtraw & Palmer, supra note 27, at 819 ("Strong incentives exist for par-
ties to argue for an ever-increasing share of emissions allowances through free
allocation.").
233. If the government taxes free carbon permits, a technical issue will arise in the
event that a firm receives permits in a year prior to the year in which the per-
mits can be surrendered for compliance purposes. It is possible that the terms
of a permit may specify that it cannot be used until a later year. 'The issue is
whether the firm should include the permits in income upon receipt or defer
recognizing income until the year the permits are eligible for surrender. See
JOINT COMM. ON TAxATION, supra note 26, at 7-8. In principle, the former is
preferable. The only reason to defer income recognition is the liquidity prob-
lem that might arise if a firm owes tax because income inclusion occurs in a
year prior to the year in which the firm takes a tax deduction for surrendering
the permits. S'ee id. 'This, however, should not be a significant problem if, as
expected, firms find it easy to sell the permits even though the permits cannot
be used until a later year. Id.
least some portion of the permits that they receive can be
viewed as providing compensation. Because the realization
requirement prevents immediate deduction of transition
losses, requiring that these firms include free permits in
income may cause them to be overtaxed. This prospect, how-
ever, does not convince me to support a tax exclusion similar
to the one created by Revenue Ruling 92-16. Four reasons
support my position.
First, a strong case can be made in support of a conclusive
presumption that firms receiving free permits would not have
otherwise suffered transition losses. The realization require-
ment exists largely because of the difficulty of quantifying
unrealized changes in asset values .23 4 Unrealized transition
losses resulting from the adoption of cap-and-trade are no
different. As this Section has made clear, even in the absence
of free permits, the effects of climate change legislation on
firm values would be ambiguous. Some firms would be better
off and others worse off. Identifying the firms that will suffer
transition losses and quantifying those losses will be difficult.
Additionally, it is not clear that the government will use free
permits solely to compensate transition losses. Thus, there is
no reason not to include free permits in income and apply
the realization requirement to disallow the deduction of any
unrealized losses. This approach may result in overtaxation
in some cases, but the realization requirement frequently
results in overtaxation . 2 11 Moreover, any overtaxation may
be easier to accept once we consider that cap-and-trade will
cause some firms to enjoy unrealized gains so that those firms
will effectively be undertaxed.
Second, if the problem is that the realization requirement
prevents firms from immediately deducting unrealized tran-
sition losses, then a tax exclusion that results in free permits
having no tax basis is a woefully underinclusive remedy. The
exclusion generally will benefit only those firms that receive
permits. If a firm suffers transition losses but receives no per-
mits, it will receive no benefit from the exclusion. It is not
apparent why a firm that suffers transition losses and receives
free permits should receive a tax benefit that is unavailable to
a similar firm that receives no free permits.
Third, as already discussed, a tax exclusion may lead to
tax-induced banking of permits. This in turn may increase
the overall cost of cap-and-trade and impede the objectives
of environmental policy.
Finally, a case can be made for taxing free permits even if
those permits merely compensate firms for transition losses.
The next Part develops this argument.
234. Eg., Buiin & FRIEL, supra note 158, at 29.
235. The realization requirement can result in overtaxation because by deferring
the recognition of unrealized losses, the requirement may increase the pres-
ent value of a taxpayer's tax liability. This type of overtaxation is the opposite
of the undertaxation that results when the tax on unrealized gains is deferred
until realization. For a discussion of the benefits of tax deferral, see supra text
accompanying note 113.
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Ill. Free Permits and Transition Policy
This Part argues that taxing permits used to compensate
transition losses furthers the objectives of transition policy. 23 6
It makes the case that while compensation may be necessary
to secure passage of climate change legislation, it is otherwise
undesirable. As a result, the government should, to the extent
politically feasible, minimize the amount of compensation.
One way to do that is by taxing firms when they receive per-
mits for free. In other words, if the government uses per-
mits to compensate transition losses, then a 100% excise tax
imposed upon the receipt of those permits arguably is ideal.
A 100% excise tax would produce a result similar to provid-
ing no compensation, and providing no compensation would
be the best policy if it were politically feasible. Given that an
excise tax is not likely, imposing the income tax (which may
be possible) is the next best alternative.
TO illustrate, assume that a particular firm is subject to tax
at a rate of 35% and that the firm's assets decrease in value
by $100 when the government adopts cap-and-trade. Ideally
(i.e., in a tax on economic income), the government would
allow the firm to deduct the $100 loss on its tax return. But
the government would not give the firm permits to compen-
sate it for its aftertax loss of $65. Consequently, if the firm
does in fact receive permits, taxing those permits is desirable
because it reduces the net amount of compensation.
This argument is based on the recognition that receiving
free permits is tantamount to receiving a cash grant. If the
grant itself is bad policy, then taxing the grant reduces its net
cost to the government and may therefore be good policy.
In recent years, law and economics scholars have devel-
oped a consequentialist framework for analyzing transition
policy. 237 This Part applies that framework to argue against
compensating firms for losses stemming from climate change
legislation. Section A makes the prima facie case against
compensation .2 "8 Section B discusses some potential objec-
tions to the noncompensation argument.
A. The Argument Against Compensating Firms
Changes in the law, i.e., legal transitions, often adversely
affect the value of long-term investments, which creates
losers .2 "9 Among other things, transition policy addresses
236. For a definition of transition polic3, see infra text accompanying note 240.
237. See generally Kaplow 1, supra note 3 1; Louis Kapiow, An Economic Analysis of
Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REv. 509 (1986) [hereinafter Kaplow III; WHEN
RULES CHANGE, supra note 32; Daniel Shaviro, When Rules Change Revisited,
13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 279 (2003) [hereinafter When Rules Change
Revisited]. Some of the ideas that Kapiow and Shaviro develop originated in
Michael J. Graetz, Legal Transitions: The Case for Retroactivity in Income Tax
Revision, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 47 (1977).
238. Daniel Shaviro has argued against giving away permits to firms when the gov-
ernment adopts cap-and-trade programs to control pollution. WHEN RULES
CHANGE, supra note 32, at 84-86; When Rules Change Revisited, supra note
237, at 287-88. My argument is largely consistent with Shaviro's general
points, although I discuss a number of issues that Shaviro does not specifically
address.
239. Kaplow II, supra note 237, at 511.
whether the government should compensate the losers for
their losses .24 0
Traditionally, commentators advocated compensation or
other transition relief 4 1 on the grounds that investors had
reasonably relied on current law in making their invest-
ment decisions . 2 4 2 More recently, scholars have challenged
this reliance argument .2 43  Given that the law changes fre-
quently, investors arguably cannot reasonably rely on the sta-
tus quo .2 4 4 Moreover, the government could always negate
the reasonableness of reliance by announcing that all laws are
subject to change .2 45 Additionally, investors appear to have
no stronger a normative claim to compensation for transi-
tion losses than for other types of losses, which typically go
uncompensated . 2 4 6
These criticisms have eroded some of the traditional sup-
port for the reliance argument. Recent literature instead
focuses on the consequentialist framework for evaluating
transition policy, 247 which examines the economic and politi-
cal consequences of transition relie f.2 4 1
Subsections 1 and 2 use the general conclusions of the con-
sequentialist analysis to argue that the government should
not give away permits to compensate firms that suffer losses
as a result of cap-and-trade. Subsection 3 offers an additional
argument against compensation, namely that it may cause
cap-and-trade to be less efficient and equitable by reducing
money available for tax cuts and consumer rebates.
I. Compensation as an Unnecessary and
Inefficient Form of Risk Mitigation
The possibility of legal change imposes a risk upon investors
and part of the appeal of compensation is that it mitigates
this risk . 249  Nonetheless, the consequentialist framework
240. Id.; Barbara H. Fried, Ex Ante/Ex Post, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 123,
123 (2003). Legal transitions can also enhance the value of investments. For
example, as discussed in Part II, climate change legislation may increase the
value of low-carbon assets. W~Qhere l gal transitions create transition gains, tran-
sition policy addresses whether the government should tax away those gains.
Kaplow 11, supra note 237, at 552-55 (discussing the appropriate treatment of
transition gains). As a practical matter, transition losses tend to receive more
attention than transition gains if for no other reason than the fact that "losers
cry for compensation while winners never cry for taxation." Id. at 555. 'The
treatment of transition gains is outside the scope of this Article.
24 1. Transition relief can take various forms, including compensation, grandfather-
ing, delayed implementation, and phase-ins. See WHEN RULES CHANGE, supra
note 32, at 216-26 (discussing the various types of transition relief); Kaplow
1, supra note 31, at 187 (same). W~hatever its form, transition relief reduces or
eliminates transition losses. The analysis in the text focuses on compensation
because free emissions permits are effectively equivalent to cash and serve as a
type of compensation.
242. Kaplow 11, supra note 237, at 522 (discussing and rejecting the reliance
argument).
243. See, e.g., Kaplow 11, supra note 237, at 522-27; WHEN RULES CH1ANGE, supra
note 32, at 19; Graetz, supra note 237, at 74-79.
244. Kaplow 11, supra note 237, at 522; WHEN RULES CHANGE, supra note 32, at 19.
245. Kaplow II, supra note 237, at 522-23.
246. See id. at 523-24 (stating that arguments in favor of reliance often ignore the
fact that losses frequently occur for reasons other than government action);
Graetz, supra note 237, at 78.
247. See Kyle D. Logue, Legal Transitions, Rational Expectations, and Legal Progress,
13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 211, 225 (2003) (noting that the consequential-
ist framework "has come to dominate legal scholarship on transition issues").
248. See generally the sources cited supra note 237.
249. Kaplow II, supra note 237, at 527-28.
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demonstrates that the risk mitigation function of compensa-
tion is often unnecessary and inefficient . 2 0
One of the key insights underlying the consequentialist
framework is that from the investor's perspective, the risk of
transition losses is similar to other types of risk . 251 A loss is
a loss whether it stems from a change in the law, a change
in demand for a product, or any other type of market risk.
Because we generally regard it is a bad idea for the govern-
ment to protect investors from market risk, it follows that
the government generally should not protect investors from
the risk of transition losses unless some good reason can be
offered to distinguish the latter from the former. 25 2
Once we recognize the similarity between the risk of tran-
sition losses and market risk, the case in favor of compensa-
tion is considerably weakened .2 3 Generally, it is undesirable
to use compensation to mitigate the risk of transition losses
for the same reason it is undesirable to use compensation to
mitigate market risk .25 4 Investors frequently can mitigate
both types of risk on their own (e.g., by purchasing insurance
or, more importantly for purposes of this Article, through
diversification). Moreover, private risk mitigation mecha-
nisms tend to be more efficient than government-provided
compensation . 2 5 Compensation creates inefficient incentives
by permitting investors to ignore potential losses' 25 6 which
may lead to wasteful overinvestment . 2 17 Additionally, com-
pensation may impose significant administrative costs.2 58
It requires that the government determine losses ex post
when "[plotential recipients have strong incentives to argue
for high valuations ."2 59 Diversified stock ownership, on the
250. Id at 526-50; WHEN RULES CHANGE, supra note 32, at 33-42.
251. Kaplow 1, supra note 31, at 177; Kaplow 11, supra note 231, at 535-36.
252. Kaplow II, supra note 237, at 551 ("[A] general policy of government-provided
mitigation [of the risk of transition losses] is inefficient for precisely the same
reasons that general government relief for market risks would be inefficient.");
Fried, supra note 240, at 159 ("We do not routinely protect investors against
market risk, presumably for what we regard as good reasons. If we are going to
single out that portion of market risk that is created by change in government
policy, we presumably need some good reason to do so-e.g., considerations of
political economy-that distinguishes this case from all others.").
253. Kaplow I, supra note 31, at 177-80; Kaplow II, supra note 237, at 535-36.
254. Kaplow 1, supra note 31, at 177-80; Kaplow 11, supra note 231, at 535-36.
255. Kaplow II, supra note 237, at 527-28; WHEN RULES CHANGE, supra note 32,
at 42.
256. See Kaplow II, supra note 237, at 538-42. Private risk mitigation mechanisms
may also create inefficient incentives. For example, insurance creates the risk of
moral hazard. Insureds have a reduced incentive to take steps to avoid covered
losses. Similarly, diversification may result in poor incentives. Diversified stock
ownership generally entails the separation of management and control, and
managers may not have sufficient incentives to account for potential losses that
will be borne by shareholders and not the managers themselves. Nevertheless,
the market has developed methods of balancing the tradeoff between spreading
risk through insurance and diversification and maintaining incentives. Id. at
536-41. Insurance policies frequently provide for co-insurance, deductibles,
and premiums that vary with risk, id. at 5 37- 41, and shareholders may be able
to monitor managers' behavior and structure compensation to provide manag-
ers with appropriate incentives.
251. Id. at 529 ("The efficient level of investment is that induced when investors
bear all real costs and benefits of their decisions. Therefore, the encouragement
resulting from the assurance that compensation or other protection will be
provided in the event of change results in overinvestment."). By shifting the
burden of transition losses from investors to taxpayers, compensation creates a
negative externality. Id. at 93 1.
258. Id at 541.
259. Id.
other hand, avoids this problem because any losses are spread
automatically. 2 6 0
Climate change legislation illustrates the manner in which
compensation creates inefficient incentives. If firms expect
that they will receive compensation for transition losses when
climate change legislation is adopted, they have little incen-
tive to avoid investments in carbon-intensive assets, e.g.,
investments in coal-fired power plants . 2 61 On the other hand,
if firms do not expect compensation, they have an incentive
to account for the possibility of transition losses and refrain
from overinvestment in carbon-intensive assets.262
Moreover, compensation is an unnecessary and costly way
to mitigate the risk of losses resulting from cap-and-trade.
Many of the potentially affected firms are public companies
whose ownership is dispersed among diversified investors.
Diversification will automatically spread transition losses.
Compensation, on the other hand, would require that the
government make some attempt to determine which firms
will suffer losses and the amount of those losses. As we have
already seen, ascertaining losses will not be an easy task.
Moreover, firms have an incentive to exaggerate their losses,
which is likely to result in overcompensation in many cases
and in substantial resources wasted on lobbying for free
permits .263
2. Extending the Scope of Future Laws through
Anticipation
A second key insight underlying the consequentialist frame-
work is that compensation limits the scope of future laws .26 4
As we have seen, compensation removes the incentive to
anticipate changes in the law. Contrast this with a policy of
not providing compensation, which encourages anticipation
to avoid transition losses. Anticipation effectively extends the
scope of a future law because those who anticipate it will
take it into account prior to enactment .2 5 In other words,
the future law will begin to influence behavior even before it
is adopted . 26 6 As a result, anticipation will often be desirable
where new laws result in progress and improvement . 2 6 7
Climate change legislation provides an excellent example
of how compensation limits the scope of a new law. If firms
anticipate that the legislation will include compensation, they
have little incentive to alter their investments to take it into
account. The legislation will reduce carbon emissions only
after it is officially enacted. But if firms do not expect com-
260. Id
261. See WHEN RULES CHANGE, supra note 32, at 84-86; V/hen Rules Change Revis-
ited, supra note 237, at 287-88.
262. See WHEN RULES CHANGE, supra note 32, at 84-86; When Rules Change Revis-
ited, supra note 237, at 287-88.
263. WHEN RULES CHANGE, supra note 32, at 85; see also Joskow & Schmnalensee,
supra note 23 1, at 3 8.
264. See WHEN RULES CHANGE, supra note 32, at 26, 47-49; Kaplow 1, supra note
31, at 191; Kaplow II, supra note 237, at 572-74.
265. See Kaplow 1, supra note 31, at 191; Kaplow 11, supra note 231, at 512-74;
WHEN RULES CHANGE, supra note 32, at 26, 47-49.
266. See Kaplow 1, supra note 31, at 191; Kaplow 11, supra note 231, at 512-74;
WHEN RULES CHANGE, supra note 32, at 26, 47-49.
267. Kaplow 1, supra note 31, at 191; see Kaplow 11, supra note 231, at 512-74;
WHEN RULES CHANGE, supra note 32, at 26, 47-49.
32 5-201I0
5-20 1TAXATION OF EMISSIONS PERMITS 3
pensation, they will take the legislation into account prior
to enactment, e.g., by reducing their investments in carbon-
intensive assets .2 6 1 This has the effect of expanding the legis-
lation's scope and reducing carbon emissions even before the
government puts cap-and-trade in place. And assuming that
carbon emissions are harm fu, 2 69 expanding the legislation's
scope generally will be beneficial . 27 0
3. Compensation Versus Tax Cuts and Consumer
Rebates
Another reason to oppose compensation for losses resulting
from cap-and-trade is that it reduces revenue available for tax
cuts and consumer rebates. By diverting revenue from tax
cuts, compensation may make cap-and-trade less efficient.
Because it will increase prices, cap-and-trade reduces the real
value of income, and in this sense, it is similar to a tax on
earnings .271 As a result, it may alter the incentive to work and
create an excess burden that increases the overall cost of the
program . 2 7 2 If the government auctions permits, it can use
permit value to cut existing distortionary taxes, e.g., income
and payroll taxes. Cutting taxes will at least partially offset
the program's efficiency costs.2 73 Additionally, by diverting
revenue from consumer rebates, compensation (which gener-
ally will benefit shareholders who, as a group, have higher
than average incomes) may make cap-and-trade less equi-
table. In sum, while giving away permits reduces auction
revenue available for tax cuts and consumer rebates, taxing
firms when they receive free permits will offset this effect to
some extent.
B. Potential Objections to the Noncom pensation
Argument
The previous Section argued that the government should
not use free permits to compensate firms for transition
losses. This Section addresses eight potential objections to
the noncompensation argument. Several of these objections
relate to the effects of compensation on investors. Others
are based on the claim that compensation may have positive
effects on government behavior. The Section concludes that
despite these potential objections, the case against provid-
ing compensation when climate change legislation is adopted
remains strong. This Section also discusses two caveats to the
268. See Kapiow 11, supra note 237, at 530 n.56; WHEN RULES CHANGE, supra note
32, at 26, 84-86; When Rules Change Revisited, supra note 237, at 287-88.
269. 'The argument that carbon emissions contribute to global warming has con-
siderable support among scientists worldwide. See, e.g., Elisabeth Rosenthal &
Andrew C. Revkin, Science Panel Says Global Warming is 'Unequivocal', N.Y
TIMES, Feb. 3, 2007, at Al.
270. WHEN RULES CHANGE, supra note 32, at 26, 84-86; When Rules Change Revis-
ited, supra note 237, at 287-88. Shaviro discusses some caveats to this analysis,
which I address infra Part IIB.
271. ROSEN & GAYER, supra note 54, at 341-42 (citing Ian WH. Parry and Wallace
E. Oates, Policy Analysis in a Second-Best World, 19 J. POL'yANAYSIS & MGMT.
603 (2000)); SHIFTING THE COST BURDEN, supra note 17, at 16-17.
272. ROSEN & GAYER, supra note 54, at 341-42; SHIFTING THE COST BURDEN, supra
note 17, at 16~-17.
273. ROSEN & GAYER, supra note 54, at 341-42; SHIFTING THE COST BURDEN, supra
note 17, at 16-17.
argument that the government should tax permits used to
compensate firms.
I . Too Late for Anticipation
As we have seen, the case against compensation is based in
part on anticipation. Compensation takes away the incen-
tive for investors to anticipate adoption of climate change
legislation, which may lead to wasteful overinvestment in
carbon-intensive assets and may discourage firms from
reducing carbon emissions before the legislation is adopt-
ed .2 74 Thus, part of the objective of removing the prospect
of compensation is to alter incentives prior to adoption of
the legislation. Of course, now that legislation is receiving
serious consideration, any attempt to alter incentives may
not have much effect .2 75 At this point, past investments in
carbon-intensive assets are already sunk costs. It may be too
late to affect pre-enactment behavior by threatening to with-
hold compensation . 2 7 6
This fact, however, does not completely undermine the
anticipation-based argument against compensation. If the
government compensates firms for losses sustained upon
adoption of climate change legislation, firms may be more
likely to expect compensation in the event the government
adopts cap-and-trade programs or pollution taxes intended
to regulate pollutants other than greenhouse gases .2 7 This
expectation of compensation could discourage firms from
altering their behavior in anticipation of future pollution
control legislation .2 78 Conversely, if the government refuses to
provide compensation when it adopts climate change legisla-
tion, that act may contribute to the development of a norm of
noncompensation that will encourage anticipation of future
cap-and-trade programs and pollution taxes .2 7 1 Such a norm
would create desirable incentives going forward.
2. The Possibility of Bad Laws
The argument against compensation rests in part on the
objective of extending the scope of future laws. Not provid-
ing compensation has this effect because it encourages firms
to anticipate future laws and modify their behavior to con-
form with those laws even before enactment. This response
will be beneficial if new laws tend to improve upon the sta-
274. See WHEN RULES CHANGE, supra note 32, at 84-86; When Rules Change Revis-
ited, supra note 237, at 287-88.
275. Cf Kaplow II, supra note 237, at 557-58 (noting that the benefits of anticipa-
tion will be realized only if the policy of noncompensation is known before a
reform is adopted).
276. Cf id. (noting that this problem arises whenever a policy of noncompensation
is not known in advance).
277. Cf id. (noting that if the government does not consistently follow a policy of
noncompensation, the policy will lose credibility).
278. Cf WHEN RULES CHANGE, supra note 32, at 84-86 (noting that giving permits
away as part of the acid rain cap-and-trade program likely created the expec-
tation that permits will be given away if and when the government adopts a
carbon cap-and-trade program).
279. See WHEN RULES CHANGE, supra note 32, at 84-85 (arguing that if the govern-
ment had not given away permits when it adopted the acid rain cap-and-trade
program, then it would have established a precedent that might have encour-
aged firms to anticipate future cap-and-trade programs and pollution taxes).
5-2010 3
34 ~JOURNAL OF ENERGY & ENVIRONMENTAL LAW5-0I
tus quo .28 0 But if new laws frequently are harmful, extend-
ing their scope will usually be ill advised . 2 1 For example, if
investors anticipate that the government will ban a particular
product without compensating firms that produce that prod-
uct, firms will be less likely to invest in the product in the
first place, and its supply will decrease even before the ban
is enacted . 28 2 Anticipation will effectively expand the scope
of the ban. As a policy matter, this is desirable if the ban is
appropriate, but it is not necessarily desirable if banning the
product is a mistake .28 3
If the government does not provide compensation when
it adopts climate change legislation, the likely effect will
be to expand the scope of future cap-and-trade programs
and pollution taxes through anticipation . 28 4 The question
that arises is whether this outcome is desirable. The answer
largely depends on whether in enacting cap-and-trade pro-
grams and pollution taxes the government's objective is to
achieve the optimal level of pollution or to maximize reve-
nues (e.g., through permit auctions) .28 5 If the government has
the former objective, anticipation generally will be beneficial.
But if the government has the latter objective, it may set the
quantity of pollution permits below the optimal level or the
amount of pollution taxes above the optimal level, in which
case anticipation of new environmental laws may result in
excessive pollution abatement .28 6
So which of these possibilities is more likely? It seems
improbable that the government generally will pursue a pol-
icy of excessive pollution abatement using pollution permits
or pollution taxes .28 7 This is currently not a common prac-
tice .288 Moreover, the firms that would be harmed by this
type of policy are often members of well-organized and polit-
ically influential special interest groups that are in a good
position to defend themselves .28 9
An additional point is worth noting. Even if new laws are
often harmful, the anticipation-based argument against com-
pensation does not fall apart completely.290 If the government
is determined to enact a law, even if the law itself is harmful,
it may still be beneficial for those who will be affected to
anticipate enactment .2 1 For example, if the government is
determined to enact a pollution tax that would render a par-
ticular type of facility worthless, it may be efficient if firms
that are considering investing in that type of facility take the
280. See Kaplow I, supra note 3 1, at 19 1; Kaplow II, supra note 237, at 572-74;
WHEN RULES CHANGE, supra note 32, at 26, 41-49.
281. Kaplow I, supra note 31, at 191; see Kaplow II, supra note 237, at 572-74;
WHEN RULES CHANGE, supra note 32, at 26, 41-49.
282. Kaplow I, supra note 3 1, at 19 1.
283. Id.
284. See WHEN RULES CANGE, supra note 32, at 84-86; When Rules Change Revis-
ited, supra note 237, at 281-88.




289. 1d; cf Bovenberg & Goulder, supra note 73, at 46 n. 1 (noting that firms that
are adversely affected by climate change legislation will have a strong incentive
to take political action since the stakes are high).
290. See WHEN RULES CHANGE, supra note 32, at 49; Kaplow 11, supra note 237, at
572.
29 1. See WHEN RULES CHANGE, supra note 32, at 49; Kaplow 11, supra note 237, at
572.
tax into account, regardless of whether the tax is good or
bad. But if firms expect to receive compensation when the
tax is adopted, they have little incentive to account for the tax
in their investment decisions, which may result in wasteful
overinvestment.
3. Irrationality and the Potential Unavailability of
Private Risk Mitigation Mechanisms
The argument that compensation is often unnecessary as a
risk mitigation device assumes that private actors are ratio-
nal, appreciate the risk of transition losses, and mitigate that
risk if they so desire .29 2 It further assumes the availability
of private mechanisms for mitigating transition risk, e.g.,
insurance . 2 3 In reality, these assumptions may be false in
some cases. Research in behavioral economics and finance
suggests that we suffer from numerous cognitive biases that
may prevent us from accurately perceiving certain risks .29 4 In
particular, we may fail to appreciate low-probability risks .295
Additionally, market failures, e.g., adverse selection prob-
lems, may cause insurance to be unavailable to those who
would like to purchase it.29 6 If people are not rational or if
private mechanisms for mitigating risk are unavailable 2 7
then government compensation of transition losses may be
warranted . 2 8
This argument for compensation, however, is not very
persuasive when it comes to compensating transition losses
resulting from climate change legislation. Climate change is
a well-known threat29 9 and firms have had years to anticipate
292. WHEN RULES CHANGE, supra note 32, at 19-25; Kaplow 11, supra note 237, at
548.
293. WHEN RULES CHANGE, supra note 32, at 40-42; Kaplow 11, supra note 237, at
536-50.
294. WHEN RULES CHANGE, supra note 32, at 19-25; see also Kaplow 11, supra note
237, at 548-50.
295. WHEN RULES CHANGE, supra note 32, at 40; Kaplow 11, supra note 237, at
548-50.
296. Kaplow 11, supra note 231, at 536-50; WHEN RULES CHANGE, supra note 32,
at 40-42.
297. To illustrate the problems that these two conditions create, consider the tax
deduction for home mortgage interest. If the government repealed the deduc-
tion, home values would likely fall. If homeowners anticipate the possibility
of repeal without transition relief they may wish to mitigate this risk. Two
problems arise. On the one hand, homeowners may fail to fully appreciate the
risk (e.g., because the probability of repeal is so low that they simply ignore it).
See Logue, supra note 241, at 225. On the other hand, even if homeowners do
perceive the risk, there may be little they can do about it. Insurance companies
may refuse to insure the risk because, e.g., insurance might remove the incen-
tive that homeowners have to oppose repeal. See Kaplow II, supra note 237,
at 605; Christopher T Wonnell, The Noncompensation Thesis and Its Critics: A
Review of This Symposium's Challenges to the Argument-for Not Compensating
Victims of Legal Transitions, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 293, 303 (2003).
Moreover, the investment in the home is not easily diversifiable. See WHEN
RULES CHANGE, supra note 32, at 41.
298. Kaplow II, supra note 237, at 536-50; WHEN RULES CHANGE, supra note 32,
at 40-42; Logue, supra note 247, at 225-26. Even if private actors are irra-
tional or private mechanisms for mitigating risk are unavailable, compulsory
insurance may be preferable to ex post compensation. Kaplow 11, supra note
237, at 549. Unlike compensation, a mandatory insurance program may be
able to maintain appropriate incentives through the use of premiums. Id.
299. The debate over climate change has received enormous attention for over two
decades. See, e.g., Philip Shabecoff, Global Warming Has Begun, Expert Tells
S'enate, N.Y. TIMES, June, 24, 1988, at Al (discussing the congressional testi-
mony of Dr. James Hansen of NASA regarding the warming effects of green-
house gases).
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and prepare for legislation that regulates carbon emissions. 00
Climate change legislation is not the sort of low-probability
risk that potentially affected firms are likely to have ignored
or failed to appreciate. 01 Additionally, many firms that a
cap-and-trade program might harm are public companies
with numerous shareholders. Diversification can spread vari-
ous kinds of risks, including low-probability risks of which
a particular investor is not aware and risks against which a
particular firm cannot insure.10 2 The possibility of diversifi-
cation may make the risk-mitigation function of government
compensation largely unnecessary even if investors are some-
times irrational .3 0 3
4. Fairness and the Distributive Effects of
Cap-and-Trade
The benefits of mitigating climate change will be shared
broadly by both the general public and by future generations.
Although consumers will bear most of cap-and-trade's cost,
the burden on consumers will be diffuse and may be par-
tially or completely offset by the environmental benefits that
consumers will enjoy.3 04 On the other hand, certain firms
will sustain large losses.3 05 These firms might argue that the
government should compensate them so that the burden of
the program is more evenly distributed among the program's
beneficiaries. In other words, firms might argue that it is
only fair that the government compensate them for the losses
they sustain as a result of a program that will benefit society
generally. 06
Although fairness can be an elusive concept, a number of
considerations undercut the argument that compensation is
fair in this instance. First, the purpose of cap-and-trade is to
force covered firms and their customers to bear the full cost
of carbon emissions. Up to this point, firms have imposed
these costs on others. A (perhaps controversial) argument
exists that the firms responsible for carbon emissions should
300. See, e.g., William K. Stevens, Meeting Reaches Accord to Reduce Greenhouse
Gases, N.Y TIMES, Dec. 11, 1997, at Al (discussing the Kyoto Protocol, under
which a number of countries agreed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions).
301. Cf Kaplow II, supra note 237, at 549 (arguing that misperception of risk is
of less concern when the entity subject to risk is a firm that has sophisticat-
ed managers as opposed to an individual dealing with personal risk); DuKE
ENERGY CO., 2004 SUMMARY ANNUAL REPORT 4-5 (2004) (announcing the
company's intention to "shape public policy/' with respect to climate change in
order to "advance the interests of [its] investors and customers").
302. See Kaplow II, supra note 237, at 600-01. For example, because some firms
in the electricity industry will increase in value if and when the government
adopts a cap-and-trade program, investors have the opportunity to significant-
ly reduce their net transition losses simply by holding a portfolio of diversified
stocks within the electricity sector. See Burtraw & Palmer, supra note 27, at
827-28. Diversification outside the electricity sector would further mitigate
transition risk.
303. Kaplow has pointed out that when diversification is possible, compensation
often will be unnecessary to mitigate risk even if investors fail to appreciate the
risk or if insurance is unavailable. Kaplow 1, supra note 3 1, at 178 n. 30.
304. See Bovenberg & Goulder, supra note 73, at 46 n. 1.
305. Id. at 45-46.
3fl6. The argument that fairness requires that the government broadly distribute
the burden of transition losses is a familiar one. Kaplow 11, supra note 237, at
576-77.
be left with any transition losses resulting from a program
that responds to their own harmful activity.107
Second, the argument that the government should use
compensation as a device for distributing the burden of
transition losses ignores the fact that investors can mitigate
the risk of those losses through diversification. 08 Although
firms may suffer concentrated losses, investors' losses gener-
ally will be diffuse as long as those investors own diversi-
fied portfolios. If losses are diffuse, fairness concerns become
less significant. 0 9 Additionally, to the extent that particular
investors suffer concentrated losses because they have chosen
not to diversify, compensation largely loses its appeal. The
failure to diversify constitutes either a deliberate gamble 10
or poor investment strategy. If the former is true, i.e., if an
investor has in effect bet against climate change legislation,
then no normative claim to compensation exists. After all,
"[nlo principle of ethics requires that Monte Carlo produce
only winners." 1 1 If the latter is true, the problem may sug-
gest a need for investor education programs, but it would
not appear to warrant government compensation of losses.
Incompetent investors lose money every day for a variety
of reasons, and the government does not compensate those
losses. Why should the government treat losses resulting
from climate change legislation any differently?
Finally, the distributive effects of providing compensation
to firms may lead some to conclude that doing so would be
unfair. As discussed in Part II, free permits generally will
result in a transfer of wealth from consumers to shareholders.
In general, shareholders have above-average incomes. 12 So
assuming that the shareholders of firms receiving free permits
are characteristic of shareholders generally, free permits will
largely benefit individuals with above-average incomes. 13
307. N. Gregory Mankiw, Smart Taxes: An Open Invitation to Join the Pzkou Club,
35 E. ECON. J. '4, 18 (2009); cf E. jJ. Mishan, The Post-War Literature on Ex-
ternalities: An Interpretative Essay, 9 J. ECON. LIlTErAuRlE 1, 25 (1971) ("[Jlt
may be argued [that] the freedom to operate noisy vehicles, or pollutive plant,
does incidentally damage the welfare of others, while the freedom desired by
members of the public to live in clean and quiet surroundings does not, of
itself, reduce the welfare of others. If such arguments can be sustained, there is
a case .. . for making polluters legally liable.").
308. Cf Kaplow II, supra note 237, at 536 n.74 (explaining that the financial mar-
kets have the ability to spread risk almost as broadly and perhaps even more
broadly than the government).
309. Cf Kaplow 1, supra note 3 1, at 171 (arguing that the question of how transi-
tion losses ought to be distributed is best viewed from an ex ante perspecnive
and treated as a problem involving the imposition of risk).
310. Cf WHEN RULES CANGE, supra note 32, at 18, 34-35 (arguing that anyone
who invests in a firm subject to the risk of transition losses is implicitly bet-
ting against an adverse change in the law unaccompanied by compensation); J.
Mark Ramseyer & Minoru Nakazato, Tax Transitions and the Protection Racket:
A Reply to Professors Graetz and Kaplow, 75 V. L. REv. 1155, 1159-60 (1989)
(discussing the idea that if prices of investments are discounted ex ante to
reflect the risk of transition losses, then purchasing those investments involves
a gamble and investors cannot argue ex post that the government's failure to
relieve transition losses is unfair).
311. Ramseyer & Nakazato, supra note 3 10, at 1160.
312. S'ee Jan WH. Parry, Are Emissions Permits Regressive?, 47 J. ENTcv~. ECnN. &
MGMT. 3 64, 3 75 (2004).
313. Id. at 3 64-79.
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5. Political Feasibility
Giving permits to firms may be politically expedient. Regard-
less of the merits of the approach, the reality is that free per-
mits will reduce opposition to cap-and-trade by industries
that might otherwise use their disproportionate political
influence to prevent its adoption. 14 Note that any argument
for using permits to gain the support of special interests is not
based on compensation's intrinsic merits. In fact, a firm that
wants permits need not demonstrate a loss at all. The firm
merely has to show that it has sufficient power to warrant a
payoff. In any event, if the only rationale for compensation
is that it will facilitate desirable legislation, then the govern-
ment should (to the extent politically feasible) minimize the
cost of giving permits away. Taxing firms when they receive
free permits will reduce the government's overall cost."' 5
6. Compensation as an Instrument for Improving
Government Decision Making
In some contexts, compensation may improve government
decision making. For example, the requirement that the gov-
ernment compensate landowners for takings of property may
be justified at least in part by the notion that compensation
forces the administrators of agencies that engage in takings
to internalize the costs imposed by their decisions-costs
that these administrators might otherwise ignore. 16
Although this argument may be persuasive with respect
to takings, it has less force when applied to climate change
legislation. Takings generally involve action by administra-
tive agencies.117 Because agencies are subject to a budget
constraint imposed by the legislature, administrators may be
more likely to give weight to direct outlays that appear on an
agency's budget than to any off-budget costs imposed by an
agency's actions."' Climate change legislation, on the other
hand, will be enacted by Congress, which is subject to a dif-
ferent set of political forces. Many of the benefits of climate
change legislation will be diffuse (i.e., enjoyed by the general
public and future generations), but part of the costs will be
concentrated in particular industries. 1 ' Under these circum-
stances, the public choice theory of interest group politics
suggests that industry groups are more likely to organize and
lobby in opposition to the legislation than the general public
is likely to organize and lobby in favor of it.32 0 If this is cor-
rect, lobbying efforts may cause Congress to assign too much
weight to the concentrated costs incurred by industry relative
314. See, e.g., Stavins 1, supra note 43, at 351-52; cf Kaplow 11, supra note 237, at
571-72 (discussing considerations that arise when the government uses transi-
tion relief to secure enactment of a law).
315. For example, if a firm pays tax at a rate of 35% and if the receipt of permits is
taxable, then giving the firm a permit worth $100 will impose a net cost on the
government of only $65.
316. WHEN RULES CHANGE, supra note 32, at 78-79.
317. Id. at 78.
318. Id. (citing WiLii. A. FISCHEFL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: L~w, ECONOMICS, AND
POLITICS 207 (1995)).
319. Bovenberg & Goulder, supra note 73, at 45-46.
320. S'ee id. at 2 n. 1. Lobbying efforts by environmental groups and by industry
groups that will benefit from climate change legislation, e.g., firms that special-
ize in renewable energy, may offset this effect to some extent.
to the diffuse benefits enjoyed by the public. Thus, in this
instance, it does not appear that compensating firms will be
necessary to ensure that Congress will take their potential
losses into account. In fact, as we have seen, some proponents
of climate change legislation favor giving permits away pre-
cisely because they believe doing so is necessary to overcome
the disproportionate political influence of certain industry
groups.
7. Compensation as a Restraint on Government
Action
A related but more general argument in favor of compensa-
tion is that mandatory compensation may restrain govern-
ment action in certain cases.12 ' As a result, it may appeal to
those who believe that changes in the law are often detri-
mental and should be avoided or who fear that the govern-
ment is prone to single out particular individuals or groups
for punishment. 2 2
The restraint argument may justify a compensation
requirement in certain contexts, e.g., where a law applies
narrowly to a particular individual or small group that has
little political power. But in other contexts, restraining gov-
ernment through mandatory compensation may be undesir-
able."' 3 Any benefits of doing so have to be balanced against
the costs that compensation imposes (1) by taking away the
incentive of private actors to anticipate new laws;3 24 (2) by
requiring that the government establish procedures for deter-
mining the correct amount of compensation; 25 (3) by giv-
ing private actors an incentive to waste resources lobbying
for an ever larger piece of the pie; and (4) by creating the
potential for overcompensation of groups that have dispro-
portionate political influence. These concerns are especially
significant when a law affects a large number of private actors
(as opposed to an individual or a small group) in ways that
are not easy to quantify, as would be the case for climate
change legislation . 2 1
8. Free Permits as Compensation for
Overtaxation
As discussed in Part II, some firms may be overtaxed in
the year the government adopts climate change legislation
because they will suffer unrealized transition losses that they
cannot immediately deduct for tax purposes. Should the
32 1. Kaplow II, supra note 237, at 575; Richard A. Epstein, Beware ofLegal Transi-
tions: A Presumptive Vote for the Reliance Interest, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL. ISSUES
69, 71-72 (2003).
322. Kaplow 11, supra note 237, at 575-76; Epstein, supra note 321, at 71-77.
323. See Kaplow II, supra note 237, at 575-76.
324. See id. at 567 (arguing that the benefits of using compensation to prevent gov-
ernment decision makers from undervaluing the costs imposed by their actions
must 'be balanced against its adverse incentive effects").
325. See id at 547 (discussing the administrative costs of compensation).
326. Richard Epstein, who favors the use of transition relief as a restraint on certain
types of government actions, has noted that compensation may in many cases
prove untenable for generally applicable laws that affect a large number of
private actors. Epstein, supra note 32 1, at 75-76.
36 5-2010
5-20 10 TAXATION OF EMISSIONS PERMITS 3
government use free permits to compensate firms for this
overtaxation?
I believe that the answer is no. First, it is important to keep
in mind that although transition losses are not deductible
immediately, they may ultimately be deducted either upon
realization or through depreciation. This mitigates (but does
not eliminate) any overtaxation. Second, given that overtaxa-
tion (as well as undertaxation) is an inevitable consequence
of our realization-based income tax, it is not clear why com-
pensation should be awarded in this particular circumstance.
Third, as emphasized throughout this Article, quantifying
a particular firm's transition losses, if any, will be a difficult
task. Quantifying the amount of any overtaxation result-
ing from the inability to immediately deduct those losses
would be even more difficult. Under these circumstances,
any attempt to provide compensation invites firms to waste
resources lobbying for permits.
To summarize, using free permits to compensate firms for
transition losses is arguably bad transition policy. The gov-
ernment should avoid compensation altogether. But if that
proves impossible, taxing the permits when received will
at least reduce the government's net cost and is therefore
desirable .127
9. Two Caveats
This Subsection briefly discusses two caveats to the argument
that the government should tax permits used to compensate
firms. The first caveat is that the argument assumes that
Congress will not defeat the purpose of taxation by simply
increasing the initial permit allocation to account for the
tax or by giving any tax revenue back to the firms that pay
the tax, e.g., via a cash grant. This assumption seems plau-
sible for two reasons. First, aggregate permit value is finite,
which limits Congress's ability to increase permit allocations
to account for any tax on permits. Second, although permit
allocations and cash grants are similar, the public may more
readily perceive cash grants as "corporate welfare." So Con-
gress may be less inclined to hand out cash than it is to hand
out permits. If so, then taxing permits may effectively cap the
amount available for compensating firms.
The second caveat arises from the fact that in addition to
giving permits away to compensate firms, the government
may use permits to provide subsidies that ostensibly will
benefit the public at large. The Waxman-Markey bill, for
example, allocates permits to certain firms to subsidize the
development of low-carbon assets .3 28
327. As discussed supra note 7, the government is not limited to giving permits to
covered firms. Because they can be sold, the government could use permits to
compensate firms that will suffer transition losses even if those firms themselves
are not required to surrender permits. My proposal to tax permits would apply
even if the recipient is not a covered firm. Whether or not the recipient firm
is a covered firm, we have no assurance that permits will merely compensate
it for transition losses. Regardless, the government should not use permits to
compensate firms, but if it makes the mistake of doing so, taxing the permits
when received reduces the cost.
328. See American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111 th
Cong. §§ 782(f), (i) (2f09. 'The bill also allocates permits to "trade-vulnerable
industries" to prevent domestic firms in those industries from losing market
share to foreign firms not burdened by cap-and-trade and to prevent domestic
If the government uses permits to provide subsidies for the
public's benefit, whether these permits should be taxed argu-
ably depends on, among other things, the optimal amount
of the subsidy. After all, taxation simply reduces the net sub-
sidy. This might be desirable if the pretax subsidy is either too
large or otherwise ill advised, but it might be undesirable if
the pretax subsidy is either optimal or too small.
Although this argument may have some merit, a strong
case exists that all permits should be taxed upon receipt,
regardless of the motive for allocation. It seems likely that
the government will adopt only one rule applicable to all
permits and will not tax some permits while exempting oth-
ers from tax. Given this constraint, the better rule is to tax
all permits. As already discussed, taxing permits may have
the desirable effect of limiting the amount of compensation
provided to firms. Additionally, for political reasons, Con-
gress may attempt to disguise as a program that benefits the
public a program that amounts to little more than a grant of
government funds to a politically influential industry. In any
event, if Congress determines that in certain cases, taxation
reduces the pretax subsidy for a particular program below the
optimal amount it can always increase the subsidy by making
cash grants, assuming that doing so is politically feasible.
IV. Permits Given to Local Distribution
Companies
The Waxman-Markey bill allocates a substantial portion of
permits to LDCs, which are rate-regulated firms that distrib-
ute electricity and natural gas to residential, commercial, and
industrial users. 29 LDCs own the wires and pipes through
which electricity and natural gas flow to retail customers,
and they are regulated even in states that have deregulated
other parts of the utility sector. 3 0 Waxman-Markey requires
state regulators to ensure that LDCs use the permits that
they receive to benefit their customers. 31 The bill does not,
however, clearly spell out exactly what that means. Since
LDCs themselves generally will not need permits (because
they have no emissions), one possibility is that they might sell
their permits to finance customer rebates. 3 2
firms from moving offshore to avoid the costs imposed by cap-and-trade. See
id. § 782(e). In theory, this provision could produce environmental benefits if
it avoids the relocation of carbon-intensive industries to countries that do not
regulate emissions. Nevertheless, for the reasons given in the text, I favor taxing
permits used for this purpose.
329. Id. §§ 783(b), 784.
330. NAT'L Ass'N OF REGULATORY UTIL. COMMfRS, FAQ CONSUMER BENEFITS OF
FREE C02 ALLOWANCES FOR UTLITIES (2009) [hereinafter CONSUMER BENE-
FITS], available at http://www.naruc.org/Publications/FAQ-Consumer Ben-
efits.pdf.
331. H.R. 2454 §§ 783(b)(5), 784 (c).
332. Hearing Before the Sen. Fin. Comm. on Auctioning under Cap-and- Trade, 111lth
Cong., May 7, 2009 (statement of Douglas Elmendorf, Director of the Con-
gressional Budget Office) [hereinafter Statement of Douglas Elmendorf];
STONE, HOLDING DowN INCREASES, supra note 36, at 3; CONSUMER BEN-
EFITS, supra note 330. Note, however, that Waxman-Markey requires certain
natural gas LDCs to surrender permits. H.R. 2454 §§ 700(13)U), 722(b)(8).
Additionally, some electricity LDCs are part of regulated, vertically integrated
utilities that generate electricity, and the utilities would be required to surren-
der permits. CONSUMER BENEFITS, supra note 330.
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If LDCs are required to use their permits to benefit cus-
tomers, then receipt of the permits arguably will not produce
economic income for the LDCs.A3 3 Nonetheless, this Part
argues that a compelling case exists for taxing LDCs when
they receive free permits. The problem is that giving permits
to LDCs is itself bad policy.33 4 Taxing the permits is desir-
able because it will reduce the net value of the permits to the
LDCs and their net cost to the government.
A. Problems with Giving Permits to LDCs
The ostensible rationale for giving permits to LDCs is to
reduce the burden that cap-and-trade imposes upon con-
sumers. Although this is a worthwhile objective, provid-
ing consumer relief by giving permits to LDCs may prove
both inefficient and inequitable. 35 There are better ways to
provide relief to consumers, e.g., by auctioning permits and
using the auction proceeds to fund rebates sent directly by
the government. 316
At least three serious objections can be raised to giving
permits to LDCs. First, it may cause the overall cost of cap-
and-trade to increase. 317 If LDCs use the permits to keep util-
ity bills low, e.g., by providing rebates, this will weaken the
price signal and impair the incentive to conserve electricity
and natural gas.338 This in turn will reduce emissions abate-
ment in the electricity and natural gas sectors and shift it to
other sectors of the economy where it may be more expen-
sive.339 As a result, overall abatement costs may increase.140
Consumers will save on their utility bills, but those savings
may be more than offset by increases in the prices of gasoline
and other carbon-intensive goods . 4 1
The Waxman-Markey bill attempts to avoid this problem
by stating that if LDCs provide rebates, they must provide
"rebates with regard to the fixed portion of the ratepayers'
bills or as a fixed credit or rebate," and they cannot "provide
333. See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 26, at 9 ("A reasonable argument
for the lack of any accession to wealth could exist in the case of an entity with
a regulated rate of return, such as a utility that is required to pass through to
its customers the benefits of any freely allocated allowances.") The argument
that LDCs have no economic income is apparently based on the view that
while LDCs are receiving valuable permits, they also have an offsetting obliga-
tion to pass through permit value to their customers. So the LDCs function
as a conduit through which money passes from the government to the LDCs'
customers. This view is debatable and whether LDCs have economic income
may depend on the precise rules governing the use of permits by LDCs, which,
as already mentioned, are not made clear by the Waxman-Markey bill. In any
event, I take no position on the issue and base my proposal for taxation on the
alternate grounds discussed in the text.
334. See infra text accompanying notes 335-56.
335. See STONE & SHAW, supra note 36, at 5-10; STONE, HOLDING DowN INCREAS-
ES, sudpral note 36, at 3-6; Statement of Gilbert Metcalf, supra note 36; Viard,
supra note 4, at 619-20.
336. E.g., STONE, HOLDING DowN INCREASES, sutprai note 36, at 1, 7.
331. Eg., i. at 4-6; Statement of Gilbert Metcalf, supra note 36; Statement of
Douglas Elmendorf, supra note 332; see also Viard, supra note 4, at 619-20.
338. E.g., STONE, HOLDING DowN INCREASES, supra note 36, at 4-6; Statement of
Douglas Elmendorf, supra note 332; see also Viard, supra note 4, at 619-20.
339. E.g., STONE, HOLDING DowN INCREASES, supra note 36, at 4-6; Statement of
Douglas Elmendorf, supra note 332; see also Viard, supra note 4, at 619-20.
340. E.g., STONE, HOLDING DowN INCREASES, supra note 36, at 4-6; Statement of
Douglas Elmendnrf, supra note 332; see also Viard, supra note 4, at 619-2fl.
34 1. E.g., STONE, HOLDING DowN INCREASES, supra note 36, at 6-11; Statement of
Douglas Elmendorf, supra note 332; see also Viard, supra note 4, at 619-20.
to any ratepayer a rebate that is based solely on the quantity"
of electricity or natural gas delivered to that ratepayer.1 4 2 The
apparent purpose of this restriction is to ensure that rebates
are provided as a lump sum that does not vary solely with
consumption. In other words, the rebate may lower the over-
all utility bill, but it will not affect the price paid per unit of
electricity or natural gas consumed. If the rebates are fixed
so that they do not vary based on electricity use, then in
theory they will not affect the price signal or the incentive to
conserve. The problem with this approach is that it assumes
that users of electricity and natural gas are fully informed
and rational and that they will respond to changes in vari-
able costs. That assumption may be true for commercial and
industrial users that monitor their utility bills closely. But it
seems less likely for consumers, who may respond only to
changes in their overall bill.3143 If LDCs structure rebates so
that consumers experience little or no change in their overall
bill, they may be unlikely to conserve.
Second, giving permits to LDCs may benefit the share-
holders of the LDCs' commercial and industrial customers
rather than consumers . 4 4 The Waxman-Markey bill requires
that LDCs distribute the benefits of any permits they receive
among their "ratepayer classes ratably based on. ... deliveries
to each class. 3 145 This means that if LDCs use permits to pro-
vide rebates, over 60% of those rebates will go to commer-
cial and industrial customers, not consumers. 4 6 Moreover,
if, as the bill requires, the rebates are fixed and do not affect
variable costs, then it is likely that the businesses receiving
them will not pass on the rebates to their customers in the
form of reduced prices for goods and services.14 7 The reason
is that businesses make pricing decisions based on variable
costs, not fixed costs.3 48 Fixed rebates do not affect variable
costs, so they will not affect prices . 4 9 Instead, the rebates
will increase profits and result in a windfall to sharehold-
ers.350 This problem could perhaps be corrected if LDCs
342. American Clean Energy and SecurityAct of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111 th Cong. §
183(b)(5)(B) (i), 784(c)(2) (2009).
343. STONE, HOLDING DowN INCREASES, supra note 36, at 4 n.4 (noting that the
ability of fixed rebates to preserve the price signal "is largely blunted if con-
sumers look only at the bottom line of their bill, where they would not experi-
ence the 'sticker shock' that could prompt changes in behavior"); Statement of
Gilbert Metcalf, supra note 36 ("If the value of the permits allocated to LDCs
is returned to customers on their monthly bill it is quite likely that many con-
sumers will misperceive this as a reduction in the price of consuming electricity
and natural gas."). This problem may be somewhat mitigated if rebates are
given annually instead of monthly. The Waxmnan-Markey bill, however, is not
clear as to how any rebate program should be administered.
344. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE ESTIMATED COSTS To HOUSEHOLDS FROM THE
CAP-AND-TRADE PROVISIONS OF H.R. 2454, at 56, 12 (2009) [hereinafter
ESTIMATED COSTS To HOUSEHOLDS]; STONE & SHAw, supra note 36, at 5-7.
345. H.R. 2454 §§ 783(b)(5)(C), 784(c)(3).
346. STONE & SHAw, supra note 36, at 6; see also ESTIMATED COSTS To HOUSE-
HOLDS, sutpra note 344, at 5.
347. ESTIMATED COSTS To HOUSEHOLDS, supra note 344, at 5-6, 12; STONE &
Srt~w, supra note 36, at 6-7.
348. ESTIMATED COSTS To HOUSEHOLDS, supra note 344, at 5-6, 12; STONE &
Srt~w, supra note 36, at 6-7.
349. ESTIMATED COSTS To HOUSEHOLDS, supra note 344, at 5-6, 12; STONE &
Srt~w, supra note 36, at 6-7.
350. See ESTIMATED COSTS To HOUSEHOLDS, supra note 344, at 5-6, 12; STONE
& Srt~w, supra note 36, at 6-7. The Waxmnan-Markey bill contains language
that could be interpreted as allowing LDCs to give rebates to their industrial
customers that vary based on electricity use. See H.R. 2454 § 183(b)(5)(D).
This interpretation is open to question, but if rebates to industrial customers
38 5-2010
5-20 1  TAXATION OF EMISSIONS PERMITS 3
were allowed to structure their rebates to businesses so that
the rebates reduced the cost of electricity and natural gas.
But that would create another problem that we have already
examined, i.e., it would weaken the price signal and reduce
the incentive to conserve. 51 The obvious (but perhaps politi-
cally infeasible) solution to this dilemma is to cut out the
LDCs altogether and to instead have the government auction
permits and send rebates directly to consumers. Since rebate
checks and utility bills would come in separate envelopes,
this approach would reduce the burden on consumers but
also preserve the price signal and avoid the problems associ-
ated with tying the rebates to utility bills. 512
Third, despite the fact that LDCs are regulated, they may
find ways to use permits to increase their profits. 5 3 It is pos-
sible that LDCs will use permits for purposes other than
rebates, e.g., to fund energy efficiency programs. 514 These
energy efficiency programs may be beneficial in some cases,
but as one commentator has noted, "the quality of state util-
ity regulation is uneven across the country."5 5 Thus, absent
clear guidelines from the federal government, LDCs may be
able to use permits to finance programs that ostensibly ben-
efit consumers but that actually benefit shareholders. 5 16
B. Taxing Permits Given to LDCs
Because giving permits to LDCs is itself bad policy, the
government should avoid it. But that may be impossible for
political reasons. In that case, taxing the permits may be the
next best alternative. Taxing the permits will reduce the net
permit value available for rebates. This is beneficial to the
extent that the rebates would undermine the incentive to
conserve electricity and natural gas and to the extent that the
rebates would ultimately go to the shareholders of the LDCs'
commercial and industrial customers.
Assuming, as I propose, that LDCs should pay tax on any
free permits they receive, the remaining question is the tim-
ing of the tax. Should the permits be taxed upon receipt or
when they are sold? If LDCs generally sell permits in the
year of receipt, the timing issue will be relatively unimport-
ant. But if the LDCs are permitted to bank permits, then
postponing taxation until the time of sale increases the value
of the permits to the LDCs and may ultimately increase the
amounts rebated to customers. (This will occur because tax
deferral reduces the present value of the tax owed on the per-
mits.) Increasing the amount of the rebates is undesirable for
the same reasons that giving permits to LDCs is undesirable.
Moreover, postponing taxation until the time of sale could
can vary with use, the rebates will undermine the incentive to conserve. STONE
& SHAw, supra note 36, at 7 n.
351. STONE & SHAW, supra note 36, at 9-Jo (noting that allocating permits to LDCs
will either result in "corporate welfare" or reduce the incentive to conserve).
352. See id. at io.
353. STONE, HOLDING DowN INCREASES, sutpra note 36, at 4 11.4.
354. 'The Waxmnan-Markey bill requires that natural gas LDCs use at least one-
third of the permits that they receive for energy efficiency programs. American
Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111Ith Cong. § 784(c) (5)
(2009)%.
355. STONE, HOLDING DowN INCREASES, supra note 36, at 4 n.4
356. Id.
create the problems associated with zero basis discussed in
Part II. Thus, a strong argument exists for taxing at the time
of receipt any permits given to LDCs.
Conclusion
This Article has argued that if, as seems likely, the govern-
ment gives away carbon permits, it should tax firms on those
permits when the permits are received. The government
should tax permits given to unregulated firms for three rea-
sons. First, there is no guarantee that the permits will merely
compensate for transition losses. They may in fact make
recipient firms better off than they would be if cap-and-trade
were not adopted. Second, applying a tax exclusion similar
to the one that currently applies to free sulfur dioxide per-
mits will create a tax preference for banking permits that is
potentially inefficient and unfair. Third, taxing free permits
furthers the objectives of transition policy by reducing the
net cost of giving permits away. Minimizing the cost of free
permits is desirable because it would be preferable if the gov-
ernment auctioned permits instead of using them to com-
pensate firms for transition losses.
The government should also tax permits given to LDCs.
Taxing the permits when received will reduce their net cost
to the government and their net value to the LDCs. This is
beneficial because it will reduce the net amount of rebates the
LDCs can offer their customers, which will in turn increase
the incentive to conserve electricity and natural gas and
reduce the windfall to the shareholders of the LDCs' com-
mercial and industrial customers.
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